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 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
From the late 1980 hospital merger activity has increased particularly in the United 
States1. In Europe, the public interest to provide a nationwide health care system with 
blanket coverage, has resulted in a large number of relatively small hospitals and an 
oversupply of hospital beds in some countries. This applies especially to Austria and 
Germany, where a rate of 6,1 and 6,42 beds per 1.000 population is well above the 
OECD average of 3,93.  
Both considerations on quality and cost efficiency in public healthcare have sparked 
the interest to bundle hospital activities4. Especially in Europe, where the vast 
majority of all hospitals are not-for-profit ones5, mergers have the reputation to cut 
the costs and hence reduce the financial strain on the public healthcare system. 
Consequently, mergers in the hospital sector and the development of hospital 
associations are becoming very popular in the European Union.  
 
While a lot of literature on hospitals in the United States is available, only a small 
number of scientific papers can be found on European hospital markets. In particular 
the availability of literature on estimated hospital cost functions and hospital mergers 
in Europe is limited. Consequently, any investigation on the effects of mergers on the 
European hospital market or potential economic incentives for hospitals or hospital 
wards can not be supported by corresponding scientific data.  
 
In addition to the situation described above, the special characteristics of a merger 
analysis of the hospital sector provided yet another incentive for the present work: In 
traditional merger analysis any standard industry sector aims at maximizing profits in 
a market, which is normally characterized by price competition. The industry output is 
clearly defined and easily countable. 
However, these general conditions do not apply to the hospital sector, where the 
units of output can neither be explicitly defined nor easily measured. Moreover, due 
to the fact that for hospitals profit maximization is subject to strict terms of payment – 
as agreed with public or private health insurers – quantity competition occurs. This 
statement is particularly valid for the EU health sector, which is predominantly 
comprised of not-for-profit hospitals. 
 
 
The focus of this paper is an investigation of possible consequences of mergers 
between hospitals or hospital wards on the hospital market. In order to illustrate the 
effects of a merger on costs and profits of the insiders and the outsiders a merger 
analysis is being conducted. Furthermore, the implications of mergers will be 
discussed for the private- as well as the public hospital market. The question whether 
a price increase is the inevitable result of a merger will be answered for both cases. 
 
In order to address the issues at hand in sufficient detail, the content of this paper is 
structured as follows:  
                                            
1
 See Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
2
 Wörz M., Busse R.: Analysing the impact of health-care system change in the EU member states – 
Germany (2005) 
3
 Köck C.: Krankenhäuser können gefährlich sein (2009) 
4
 See Köck C.: Krankenhäuser können gefährlich sein (2009) 
5
 Wörz M., Busse R.: Analysing the impact of health-care system change in the EU member states – 
Germany (2005) 
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 Introduction 
In the next chapter traditional horizontal merger analysis (i.e. horizontal mergers 
between single product firms) is introduced. A comparison of the one-shot non-
cooperative equilibrium in the industry before and after a horizontal merger is given.  
 
Since hospitals are multiproduct firms producing a wide range of different outputs, 
chapter 3 provides a brief recapitulation of the basic concepts of multiproduct cost 
functions in general, and of economies of scale and scope in particular.  
 
It is often difficult to measure different outputs from a service sector such as the 
hospital market. Moreover, hospital outputs can be regarded as being the most 
important variables to be includeded into a hospital cost function. Thus hospital 
outputs, their units and method of measurement are defined in chapter 4. 
 
Once the basic parameters for the hospital sector have been identified, the general 
layout of a hospital cost function together with all variables to be included therein is 
analyzed in chapter 5.  
 
On the basis of the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters an adequate hospital 
cost function for the purpose of calculation is defined in chapter 6 and a merger 
analysis of the hospital sector is conducted. The main focus of this analysis is on the 
changes in costs, profits and prices, which might occur as a result of a merger. 
Though the general approach is similar to the traditional merger analysis described in 
chapter 2, the special characteristics of the hospital sector have to be observed. 
Hence the multiproduct case instead of the single product case is analyzed.  
 
In the course of the merger analysis presented in this work it will be shown, that for a 
public hospital market mergers between hospital wards or hospitals are always 
beneficial – irrespective of any price increase – since the joint profits of the total 
market are higher after a merger than before. In contrast the results indicate that in a 
private hospital market only merging hospital wards or hospitals will benefit, while all 
other market participants will suffer financial losses.  
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 Traditional Horizontal Merger Analysis 
2 Traditional Horizontal Merger Analysis 
Analyzing the effects of a horizontal merger, economists traditionally focus on single 
product firms. Due to this fact I want to give a brief review of the single product case 
to highlight the differences to the main topic of this thesis, horizontal merger analysis 
of multiproduct firms like hospitals, dealt with in detail in chapter 6. Supposedly 
Cournot competition is a good way of describing the hospital market where it is more 
likely that hospitals compete in quantities and not in prices. This applies especially in 
Europe, where a broad public health insurance system is available. Consequently, an 
analysis of horizontal mergers in the hospital market is given in chapter 6 whereas 
chapter 2 describes mergers of one product firms in a market where Cournot 
competition is present.  
 
The subject of this chapter is the comparison of the one-shot non-cooperative 
equilibrium in the industry before and after a horizontal merger. In doing so, one has 
to distinguish between mergers which induce efficiency gains and between mergers 
where these gains are absent. 
 
2.1 Horizontal Mergers which Create no Efficiency Gains  
In his book Motta6 states that it is likely that a merger increases the market power of 
the merging firms without creating any efficiency gains. This is accompanied by a 
reduction of the consumer surplus and the total welfare.  
 
In the Cournot competition scenario firms determine the output quantities they are 
going to produce. If a merger takes place, the merging firms (i.e. insiders) reduce 
their output quantities to raise the price charged for this product, whereas the other 
firms in the market (i.e. outsiders) expand their production which will then reduce the 
price increase. J. Farrell & C. Shapiro7 formulate these findings in their lemma8 
stating that under popular assumptions9 the aggregate output moves in the same 
direction as the insider’s output, but on a smaller scale. This supports the comment 
of Motta and also of M. Perry & R. Porter10, who mention that with absent efficiency 
gains the outsiders will benefit more from the merger than the insiders. In addition, M. 
Perry & R. Porter conclude that this is also the reason why an increase in total 
industry profits does not need to be profitable for the insiders.  
Furthermore, they state that the profits of the insiders can only exceed those of the 
constitute firms in the pre-merger situation if the merger indicates a price increase 
large enough to offset the reduced output.  
 
M. Perry & R. Porter suggest that if the number of insiders is small the output 
reduction associated with the merger is also small, indicating a small price increase 
and reducing the profitability of the merger. Consequently, there exists an incentive 
for a large number of firms to merge but not for a small number. 
                                            
6
 Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2003)  
7
 Farrell J., Shapiro C.: Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis (1990)  
8
 Analyzing a homogeneous-goods industry 
9
 The firms’ reaction curves are downward sloping and each firm’s residual demand curve intersects 
its marginal cost curve from above. 
10
 Perry M., Porter R.: Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger (1985)  
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S. Salant & S. Switzer & R. Reynolds11 demonstrate in their paper12 that a merger 
among symmetric firms is unprofitable if less than 80% of the firms in the industry 
merge. They also show that a merger to a monopoly is always lucrative because then 
joint profits will be maximized. Furthermore they state that “(…) if a merger by a 
specified number of firms causes losses (respectively gains), a merger by a smaller 
(larger) number of firms will cause losses (gains).” 
 
 
J. Farrell & C. Shapiro mention that a merger without synergies will result in a price 
increase. They set up the proposition that in a Cournot oligopoly a price increase 
occurs only if the mark-up of the insiders is less than the pre-merger mark-ups of the 
constitute firms. This statement does only apply if the insiders output is as much as 
the aggregate output of the constitute firms in the pre-merger situation. Furthermore, 
the authors note that if under certain assumptions13 a merger among firms is 
profitable and raises the industry price it would although raise welfare. 
In addition, Motta recognizes that a merger even without efficiency gains can 
increase welfare if the insiders consist of small firms whereas the outsiders are large 
ones. It is feasible that an output reduction of the small merging firms induces a 
larger output expansion from the outsiders.  
 
 
In summery, the traditional model in industrial economics as given above indicates 
that a merger without creating any efficiency gains is likely to reduce consumer and 
total welfare, raises the industry price and the producer surplus and also increases 
the market power of the insiders.  
 
After describing the horizontal merger analysis with absent efficiency gains the 
results shall be illustrated by a sample calculation14.  
 
2.1.1 Sample Calculation 
In the simplest and also most popular standard Cournot model  firms produce 
perfectly homogeneous goods with constant marginal costs . Capacity constraints 
do not exist so the firms are able to satisfy all the demand they face.  
Suppose the market demand is given by the inverse demand function     –   
where  represents the total industry output.  
 
 
− Pre-Merger Situation 
 
The equilibrium output of any of the   1, … ,  firms in the industry can be calculated 
as follows: 
 
 .           ∑      !  2.1 
                                            
11
 Salant S., Switzer S., Reynolds R.: Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous 
Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (1983)  
12
 As J. Farrell and C. Shapiro (1990) the authors also analyzed a homogeneous-goods industry. 
13
 The merging firms have sufficiently small market shares, ##, ### and their marginal costs are non-
negative. The third derivative of their cost functions with respect to their quantities is non-positive. 
14
 The exercise and also the solution can be found in Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and 
Practice (2003) 
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To maximize the profit function of any of these firms, the first order condition has to 
be calculated: 
 
 
$ %&$ '&    2    ∑      0(  2.2 
 
 
Because the products of the different firms are perfectly homogeneous one can insert   1 instead of ∑ (  into the first order condition of the )* firm. This gives 
 
   2      1     0 2.3 
 
 
Solving this equation for , the equilibrium output for any firm in the industry can be 
obtained: 
 +   ,-./!    0   1, … ,  2.4 
 
 
Inserting the equilibrium output into the profit function above gives the equilibrium 
profit from one firm in the industry: 
 
 +     ·  +   +   ,-.2/!2     0   1, … ,  2.5 
 
 
− Post-Merger Situation 
 
Suppose that  4  1 firms merge and that because of the standard assumptions in 
the oligopoly model (homogeneous goods, no capacity constraints) there are now  
firms less in the industry. Therefore, the industry consists of  –   independent firms 
after the merger. 
 
Following the calculation principle from the pre-merger situation15, one can obtain the 
equilibrium output of any of the  –   firms in the industry: 
 
   +   ,-.-5/!     0   1, … ,    2.6 
 
 
By inserting again the equilibrium quantities into the profit function the equilibrium 
profit of one firm in the industry can be obtained: 
 
   +   ,-.2-5/!2     0   1, … . ,    2.7 
 
 
An outsider always gains from the merger if    7   holds. For the 
insiders a gain from the merger can be found if    7  4 1 ·  . This is 
due to the fact that in the pre-merger situation  4 1 firms which are then involved 
                                            
15
 The single difference being    instead of  firms in the industry 
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 Traditional Horizontal Merger Analysis 
in a merger obtain the equilibrium profit whereas after the merger only one of the  4  1 firms persists.  
 
The merger situation can also be shown graphically. Since in the Cournot model 
quantities are strategic substitutes, the reaction functions of the firms are downward 
sloping.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Production Responses of a Merger with no Efficiency Gains, Strategic Substitutes 
Salant S., Switzer S., Reynolds R. (1983) 
 
 
The equilibrium in the pre-merger situation is given by the point A in the graph, where 
the future insiders produce the quantity 8916 and the outsiders turn out 89. After the 
merger the insiders restrict their aggregate output, internalizing the losses caused to 
each other. For that reason their reaction function shifts downward into the new 
equilibrium position B.  
 
In the post-merger scenario the insiders produce an aggregate quantity of 9 , 17 and 
the outsiders produce 9. As already mentioned in the Cournot model, quantities are 
strategic substitutes which mean that the rivals’ response to a quantity restriction of 
the insiders will be a quantity expansion. The outsiders then have the possibility to 
gain market shares but they simultaneously diminish the price increase from the 
insiders. Consequently, the insiders loose market shares and in addition have a profit 
reduction if the lower quantity produced is not compensated through the price 
increase in the market (i.e. if the outsiders expand their production too much).  
 
The profit situation can also be shown in a graph: 
 
                                            
16
 NC stands for noncolluding insiders. 
17
 C stands for collusive insiders. 
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Figure 2 Profit Consequences of a Merger with absent Efficiency Gains 
Salant S., Switzer S., Reynolds R. (1983) 
 
 
S. Salant & S. Switzer & R. Reynolds18 state that irrespective of the output quantities 
the rivals are going to produce, the aggregate profits of the insiders have to be higher 
in the post-merger situation than in the pre-merger one since they can always adopt 
their production to copy the pre-merger situation. This is illustrated in figure 2 with the 
line :919 situated above the line :89. The authors note that it is somewhat 
surprising, that even under this condition losses due to horizontal mergers are 
possible. The reason for this occurrence is the fact that the equilibrium in the pre-
merger situation disappears after a merger so that the insiders have the incentive to 
restrict their output quantities20.  
In the pre-merger situation the equilibrium profits of the insiders are represented by 
the point A’. It is possible that after the merger the outsiders increase their production 
to an extent that the aggregate profits of the insiders will fall (this scenario is 
illustrated in figure 2). The new equilibrium profits of the insiders are now represented 
by point B’. As can be seen in the figure and has been mentioned above, the 
profitability of a merger can not be regarded as a certainty.  
 
 
Looking at mergers creating efficiency gains the situation described above changes. 
This problem will be addressed in the next section.  
 
                                            
18
 Salant S., Switzer S., Reynolds R.: Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous 
Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (1983)  
19
 I represents the insiders. 
20
 Given that the output quantities of the rivals are unchanged. 
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2.2 Horizontal Mergers which Induce Efficiency Gains 
As mentioned in the previous section, a merger which does not coincide with 
efficiency gains is expected to reduce consumer welfare and welfare in total. The 
situation differs if gains in efficiency due to a merger can be achieved. If the insiders 
become more efficient (resulting in lower unit costs), they can outweigh the increase 
in market power. If the cost reduction is large enough, prices can fall and consumers 
will benefit from the new industry structure. The reason for this development is that a 
reduction in output and thus a price increase may not be the most profitable strategy 
if efficiency gains are involved. Reducing prices and attracting new customers can be 
a more lucrative strategy. Motta21 describes the case where prices and unit costs 
decrease proportionately after the merger and therefore the unit mark-up remains the 
same as in the ex-ante case. In the post-merger situation, total profits will still be 
higher since the lower prices attract new consumers.  
 
If efficiency gains accompany the merger, the insiders have two possible strategies 
to increase their profits: To reduce the quantities they produce and thus increase 
their prices or increase produced quantities to reduce the prices charged. Motta 
states, that the higher the efficiency gains achieved, the more likely the insiders 
reduce their prices resulting in higher consumer and total welfare22.  
 
J. Farrell & C. Shapiro23 also analyze a merger situation where synergies24 occur. 
They find that “rather impressive synergies25 are typically necessary for a merger to 
reduce price.” Furthermore, they note that the larger the market shares of the 
insiders or the smaller the elasticity of demand, the greater must be the synergies in 
order to induce falling prices. In addition, the authors consider that their result is 
strengthened if a merger changes the competitive conduct from Cournot to 
something less competitive.  
 
A merger which comes along with gains in efficiency will change the competitive 
positions in the market. Unlike the results in section 2.1, outsiders may loose from 
the merger because a reduction of the insiders’ unit costs give them the ability to cut 
their prices. If the efficiency gains are sufficiently large so that the insiders will really 
cut their prices, the outsiders’ profits will decrease. In this case the effect on welfare 
is positive. 
S. Salant & S. Switzer & R. Reynolds determine that even if a merger creates 
efficiency gains through economies of scale, losses can still be caused. 
Nevertheless, mergers which go along with efficiency gains might be beneficial for 
society even if the insiders run losses. 
 
 
There are several reasons why insiders might be able to reduce their costs along 
with a merger: They may reorganize their production by an improvement of the 
division of inputs or they may achieve economies of scale or/and economies of 
scope. Motta also lists synergies in research and development, cost savings in 
                                            
21
 Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2003) 
22
 For a proof see Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2003) 
23
 Farrell J., Shapiro C.: Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis (1990)  
24
 The authors quote Lawrence White, who wrote that “all merger proposals will promise theoretical 
savings in overhead expense, inventory costs, and so on; they will tout synergies.” 
25
 E.g.: learning, economies of scale 
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administration, rationalization of distribution and marketing activities or the 
replacement of less qualified managers as possible benefits gained from mergers.  
Generally, a distinction whether the cost savings mainly affect variable production 
costs or fixed costs has to be made. If the synergies mainly change variable 
production costs, the price setting behavior may be modified, whereas the price 
decision will remain the same if mainly fixed costs are involved. Nevertheless, 
efficiency gains in fixed costs can have a positive welfare effect because the insiders’ 
producer surplus will rise while the consumer surplus will not change. Motta states 
that competition authorities shall have a close look if these cost savings could also be 
gained without a merger (i.e. the savings are not merger-specific) and thus a 
reduction of market participants is not necessary and desirable. 
 
 
The following subsection contains a sample calculation26, which differs from the one 
given above (2.1.1) since now insiders attract efficiency gains because of the merger. 
 
2.2.1 Sample Calculation 
Suppose that there are three identical firms in the market, each of which producing a 
homogeneous good. As in the above example they have constant marginal costs  7 0 and the industry demand is given by   1   where  represents the industry 
output.  
 
 
− Pre-Merger Situation 
 
The profit function of each of the three firms is given by: 
 
   1      ;1        <   =   , >, ?  1, 2, 3  
  @  A > A ? 2.8 
 
 
To obtain the equilibrium output quantities the first order condition has to be 
calculated: 
 
 1  2       <     0     , >, ?  1, 2, 3 
  @  A > A ? 2.9 
 
 
Due to the situation that the firms in the industry produce homogeneous goods, one 
can obtain a symmetric equilibrium output for any firm in the market: 
 
 .   !-.B  2.10 
 
 
By inserting the equilibrium quantities into the inverse demand function the 
equilibrium price will be achieved: 
 .   !/C.B  2.11 
                                            
26
 The sample calculation is given in Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2003) 
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Also the equilibrium profit for any of the three firms in the market is now identified via 
inserting the equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium price into the profit function of 
each firm: 
 .   !-.2!D  2.12 
 
 
− Post-Merger Situation 
 
Suppose that a merger between two of the three firms takes place (i.e. because the 
firms produce homogeneous goods, there is one firm less in the market but there is 
still some competition after the merger). Furthermore one must consider, that the 
insider achieves efficiency gains in terms of production at marginal costs E with E F 1, whereas the outsider still produces at marginal costs . 
 
Motta27 assumes that firms 1 and 2 merge with only firm 1 persisting as the insider in 
the market. Firm 3 represents the outsider, which has marginal costs .  
 
The profit functions from the insider and the outsider are given by: 
 
 !  1    E!  1  !  C   E! 
 
 C  1    C  1   !   C   C 2.13 
 
 
Calculating the first derivative of the profit function with respect to their own quantity, 
one obtains the first order conditions: 
 
 
$ %G$ 'G  1  2 !   C   E  0 
 
 
$ %H$ 'H  1   !   2 C     0 2.14 
 
 
The reaction functions of the firms are given as follows: 
 
 I!C   !- 'H- J.K  
 
 
 IC!   !- 'G- .K  2.15 
 
 
These functions also define the equilibrium quantities of the insider and the outsider: 
 
 !  !-. KJ-!C  
 
 
                                            
27
 Motta M.: Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2003)  
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C   !-. K-JC   2.16 
 
Motta notes that the outsider only produces a positive amount in the equilibrium if the 
cost savings are not too large, i.e. 
 C  L 0  M  E L  K.-!.   2.17 
 
If in addition  N  !K , the expression from 2.17 becomes negative, which means that 
the outsider will always sell products in the equilibrium28.  
 
 
Inserting the equilibrium quantities into the inverse demand function gives the 
equilibrium price: 
 
 5   !/. !/JC  2.18 
 
 
Having the equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium price, one can also calculate the 
profits of the insider and the outsider in the equilibrium: 
 
 !   !-. KJ-!2O  
 
 
 C   !-. K-J2O  2.19 
 
 
Motta notes, that a price decrease after the merger only occurs if the efficiency gains 
are sufficiently large. A price reduction after the merger happens if 5  F  ., giving 
the following condition: 
 E F  P.-!B.  2.20 
 
He recognizes that no matter how large the efficiency gains are, there will never be a 
price decrease if   N  !P . This statement can be explained by the fact that the right 
hand side of expression 2.20 becomes negative which suggests that the inequality 
will never occur.  
 
 
One can also investigate whether the merger is profitable or not. Doing so, one has 
to check if !  L 2 . applies. After some calculations one obtains that this inequality 
is valid if 
 E F  B !/.- C √K !-.R.  2.21 
 
The solution shows that the merger is only profitable if enough cost savings can be 
achieved.  
 
 
                                            
28
 This is due to the fact that the efficiency gain e is always bigger in this case.  
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After describing the implications of mergers with and without efficiency gains, one will 
recognize that both cases will result in an increase in the market power of the 
merging firms. In the next section I want to describe several variables which can 
influence the likelihood of an increase in the market power.  
  
2.3 Variables which Influence Market Power 
There are several variables which influence the possibility of the insiders to increase 
their market power. Motta itemizes some of them, which shall be briefly reproduced 
in this section.  
 
 
• Concentration 
 
The more independent firms are operating in the market after a merger, the less 
probable a hurtful situation for the consumers will occur.29 
A frequently used concentration index is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index SST, 
which is defined as the sum of the squares of the firm’s market share in the 
industry30. The values of the HHI can vary between 0 (if the market is completely 
fragmented) and 10.000 (if only a single firm is in the market). An additional 
measurement for the presumable change in concentration is ∆SST, which measures 
the difference between the post- and pre-merger concentration31. The European 
Commission categorizes mergers to be harmless as long as 1.000 F SST F2.000 M ∆SST N 250 or SST 7 2.000 M ∆SST N 150 respectively. 
 
 
• Market Shares and Capacities 
 
As shown above, market shares can also be used as an indicator for a probable 
change in the market power due to a merger.  
J. Farrell & C. Shapiro32 demonstrate in their paper that a small reduction in the 
insiders output has a net positive welfare effect on outsiders and consumers if the 
market shares of the insiders are sufficiently small. They also state that the lower the 
market shares of the insiders the less worse is the effect on the market prices. 
 
Available capacities are also important with regards to possible price changes. The 
larger the unused capacities of rivals, the less possible it is for insiders to deploy 
market power.33 This is caused by the following mechanism: If merging firms raise 
the prices and consumers have the possibility to switch to rivals (who can naturally 
satisfy the additional demand) this effect operates as a regulation on the insider’s 
behavior. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
29
 Other things being equal. 
30
 SST   ∑ K !  31
 ∆SST   ∑ ∑    ! !  
32
 Farrell J., Shapiro C.: Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis (1990)  
33
 Other things being equal. 
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• Entry 
 
The possibility to increase the prices after a merger is also limited by the presence of 
potential entrants. If the insiders are going to raise their prices after a merger (i.e. 
they reduce their output quantities), potential entrants might possibly be activated. 
Due to this reason, the merging firms may not raise their prices in order to block 
further market entries. This repression of the market power via potential entrants is 
primarily dependent on the fixed costs involved. The higher these sunk costs, the 
higher is the scope for any price increases of the insiders. 
 
 
• Demand Variables 
 
Demand variables can also affect the market power of a firm. The market may be 
characterized by high switching costs with consumers not being able to change their 
provider simply. If this is the case, the merging firms enjoy market power and can 
therefore raise their prices easier. One can conclude that the lower the elasticity of 
market demand the higher the range for price increases. 
 
 
• Buyer Power 
 
It is possible that also downstream firms can restrain insiders which are upstream in 
the production process. Strong buyers can threaten the merging firms which increase 
their prices by cancelling orders or by starting the upstream production by 
themselves. 
 
 
Looking at the market power which can increase after a merger, one should also take 
into account the so called failing firm defense. It is feasible that a merger involves a 
failing firm which can not survive on its own in the industry any longer. In this case, 
the ex-post merger situation must not be compared with the ex-ante merger situation 
but rather with the situation that will occur if the failing firm will leave the market.  
 
2.4 Mergers and Collusion 
As shown so far a merger can decrease consumer surplus and also total welfare by 
increasing market power. Generating a better situation for collusion in the market can 
be regarded as another negative effect of mergers on the welfare. It is possible that 
before a merger collusion in the industry is not stable, this situation changing when a 
merger takes place. The reason for this assumption is that a merger reduces the 
number of independent firms in the market with the collusive behavior of fewer firms 
needing to be coordinated. It is obvious, that fewer firms in the industry indicate a 
higher readiness of collusion and also a stronger willingness to charge higher prices. 
A different pro-collusive effect may be the one that a merger distributes the assets in 
a certain market more symmetric. If this happens to be the case, a collusive outcome 
is more likely. Motta also states that it is a priori very difficult to make a statement 
whether or not a particular merger will lead to collusion. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Traditional merger analysis predicts that in the single product case horizontal 
mergers without creating efficiency gains usually cause higher prices and thus lower 
consumer surplus and total welfare. Nevertheless, also in a situation where no 
efficiency gains can be obtained the outcome is uncertain. If the quantity reduction of 
the insiders is more than offset by an output increase of the outsiders, prices will fall 
and therefore consumer surplus will rise.  
The situation after a merger is also ambiguous if efficiency gains can be achieved. A 
price increase but also a price reduction can reasonably be assumed since new 
customers can thereby be attracted.  
 
 
Before investigating the multiproduct case in general and the question how costs and 
profits will change after a merger in particular, some other general aspects of the 
topic have to be investigated. The next chapter (3) shall give a brief reminder on 
multiproduct cost functions, especially on calculating multiproduct scale economies 
and multiproduct economies of scope. Since hospitals produce special outputs, 
chapter 4 describes different hospital outputs and their units of measurement. The 
following chapter 5 contains the basic elements needed for calculation. There 
different hospital cost functions and the importance of certain variables will be 
presented. Having found statistically significant variables in hospital cost functions, a 
hypothesized function will be used for the merger analysis in the final chapter.  
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3 Multiproduct Cost Functions 
Hospitals are multiproduct firms producing a wide range of different outputs. These 
outputs can be summarized through the following main categories: education, 
research, community services, outpatient care and inpatient care. Naturally these 
broad categories can further be subdivided, e.g. into particular diseases, into different 
education levels or the like.  
Before analyzing how to measure these diverse hospital outputs and focusing on 
hospital cost functions in detail, a brief reminder on the basic concepts of 
multiproduct cost functions in general, and on economies of scale and scope in 
particular will be given. Some authors34 state, that economies of scale and scope are 
present in the hospital sector, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
Hence the present chapter will show how economies of scale and scope can be 
calculated. Moreover, properties of multiproduct cost functions will be described. 
 
3.1 Properties of Multiproduct Cost Functions 
Suppose there are  inputs which are represented by the input vector  !, … , 5, and  outputs characterized by the output vector V  V!, … , V. The 
production-possibility set W is given by W  X, V | V  ZE [\@]E@ M[\ ^ which 
is simply a list of possible combinations of inputs and outputs.  
 
The multiproduct cost function, where _ 7  0 denotes the vector of constant input 
prices, is defined as follows: 
 
 `_, V   mind  X _ ·  | , Ve W^   _ · +_, V 3.1 
 
with +_, V being the vector of input levels that minimizes the cost of producing V at 
input prices _. In order to have a cost function which is as well positive for positive 
outputs as it is weakly increasing in output quantities and input prices and 
furthermore satisfies `0    0, a regularity condition is necessary and sufficient: 
 
• Input vectors  e f g  I/5, output vectors V e h g  I/ 
• T is a nonempty and closed subset of f i  h and  
o 0, V e W M V   0  
o (, V e W, ’, V’ e  f i  h, ‘ L , @ V‘ F  V lV mnm ’, V’ e W 
 
In order to have a well defined multiproduct cost function, further properties have to 
be fulfilled: 
 
• If V > 0, `_, V has a partial derivative with respect to V, denoted by ` 
• `_, V is nondecreasing in factor prices _, i.e. _’ L  _  indicates  `_’, V  L  `_, V 
• Homogeneous of degree 1 in _, i.e. `m · _, V    m · `_, V M\[ ll m 7  0 
• `_, V is concave in _ and  
• continous in _ 
                                            
34
 E.g.: Sinay U., Campbell C.: Scope and Scale Economies in Merging Hospitals Prior to Merger 
(1995), Wang J., Zhao Z., Mahmood A.: Relative Efficiency, Scale Effect, and Scope Effect of Public 
Hospitals: Evidence from Australia (2006)  
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After this brief reminder35 on the various conditions of cost functions, a detailed view 
on economies of scale and scope is given in the next section. 
 
3.2 Ray Average Costs and Multiproduct Scale Economies 
Average costs in a multiproduct firm, where the production can be described by an 
output vector V A  0, are called ray average costs Io` and are defined by 
 
 Io`V   9p∑ p&q&rG  3.2 
 
Ray average costs are strictly declining at V  V!, … , V if there exists an s 7  0 so 
that 9tpG,…,tpq t   N  `V M\[ ll 1 N u N 1 4  s and 9tpG,…,tpqt  7  `V M\[ ll 1   s N u N 1. This means that ray average costs are decreasing if a small 
proportional change in the output brings less than a proportional change in total 
costs. Furthermore, ray average costs are minimized at V if for all positive  m A  0 Io`V N Io`m · V applies. As in the single-product case, the theory suggests that 
the ray average cost curve is U-shaped in the volume of output. This implies that 
along each ray a unique point, where the ray average costs are minimized, exists. 
 
 
Ray average costs can also be used to define the degree of ray economies of scale, 
which measures the reaction of total costs if a proportional change in all output 
categories takes place (holding all other variables constant).  
 
The degree of scale economies for the whole product set v   X1, … , ^ is given by  
 w8V   9p∑ p&9&pq&rG  _nE[E `V   $9p$p&   x `   
 
 w8V   yz9p{9p  3.3 
 
Economies of scale are increasing w8  7 1, decreasing w8  N  1 or constant w8   1 if the Io`V are greater than, less than or equal to x`V.  
 
 
To identify the product-specific economies of scale is also from particular interest. In 
this case, one measures the change in total costs for a variation in the output of one 
product and not of the entire range. In order to do so, it is necessary to introduce the 
concept of incremental costs. The incremental costs of product  e v at V are defined 
by 
 
 T `V   `V   `V8- 3.4 
 
which gives the additional costs when adding product  to the production line. The mn 
element of the vector V8- has a zero component, whereas all other components 
equal to those of V. It is clear that the average incremental costs are then given by: 
                                            
35
 See Baumol W.J., Panzar J.C., Willig R.D.: Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure (1988) for a more detailed explanation. 
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 oT `V   :9&pp&  3.5 
 
One can now define the degree of scale economies specific to any product  at an 
output vector V, holding the outputs of all other products constant: 
 
 wV   :9&pp&·9&p   z:9&{9&  3.6 
 
Returns to scale for product  can then be increasing (wV 7 1), decreasing 
(wV  N  1) or constant (wV   1).  
 
 
The calculation of product-specific returns to scale for a subset W | v is also 
possible. Here the output varies for two or more products, whereas all other output 
levels are held constant. Analogous to the approach above one must first define the 
incremental costs of the product set W by T`}V   `V   `V8-}. The vector V8-} 
comprises zero components for the products included in W whereas all other 
components equal to those of V. The average incremental costs of the product set W 
at V are given by oT`}   :9~p∑ p~ . 
 
 
Analogous, a measurement of the degree of scale economies specific to the product 
set T is also feasible: 
 w}   :9~p∑ p·9p~   z:9~{9~  3.7 
 
The interpretation remains the same as above, i.e. there are increasing (w}  7 1), 
decreasing (w}  N  1) or constant returns to scale (w}   1) for the subset W. If W   v, 
this expression is identical to the multiproduct measure at the beginning of this 
chapter and if W   X^ it is identical to the definition of the degree of scale economies 
specific to any product .  
 
3.3 Economies of Scope 
Due to the fact that hospitals are multiproduct firms, it is likely that cost savings result 
only from the production of several different outputs in one hospital instead of 
generating each product by a specialized firm. This means that for a hospital it is 
possible to reduce its costs only by expanding the scope of its operations. The 
concept of jointness is closely related to those of economies of scope36. If non-
jointness in the production process occurs, the cost function can be written as: 
 
 `V!, … , V;  _!, … , _5   `!V!;  _!, … , _5 4  … 4 `V;  _!, … , _5 3.8 
 
 
Economies of scope can be defined as follows: 
 
                                            
36
 Also the concept of subadditivity is closely related to the one of economies of scope. 
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Let   XW!, … , W< denote a nontrivial partition of w |  v. That is,  W  w, W    W 0 M\[  A >.  W  A 0, @ ? 7 1. There are economies of scope at V with respect to 
the partition  if 
 
∑ `V} 7 ` V< !  3.9 
 
If no economies of scope are present, the above defined cost function 2.8 for non-
jointness occurs. Additionally, weak economies of scope are present if the inequality 
under 3.9 is weak rather than strict and diseconomies of scope are present if the 
inequality sign is reversed. For the two-output case it follows that v   X1, 2^,    XX1^, X2^^ and economies of scope exist if `V!, VK N `0, VK 4  `V!, 0.  
 
 
After defining economies of scope in general, a formula to identify the degree of 
economies of scope for two subsets, W and v   W , is given: 
 
 w`}V   9p~/ 9p~- 9p9p  3.10 
 
This expression measures the relative increase in costs, which would result from 
producing the products comprised in the subset W and the products included in the 
subset v   W separately. Adding the two subsets W and v   W together results in 
the whole production set v. Such a fragmentation will increase the total costs of a 
firm (w`}V  7 0), decrease them (w`}V  N  0) or leave them unchanged (w`}V  0).  
 
 
Economies of scale and economies of scope are linked by the following expression: 
 
 w8V   ~~p/ !- ~~p!- 9~p  _nE[E }   ∑ p9~ ∑  p9  3.11 
 
If w`}V   0 (i.e. absence of any economies or diseconomies of scope), the overall 
economies of scale are only a weighted sum of product-specific economies of scale. 
If economies of scope are present (w`}V > 0), the denominator is less than 1. This 
means that even if the product-specific economies of scale are constant, there will be 
increasing returns to scale over the entire product line. Moreover, if the product-
specific economies of scale are decreasing, strong economies of scope can leave to 
overall returns to scale.  
 
 
One can also identify economies of scope via the concept of cost complementarities. 
A twice-differentiable cost function exhibits weak cost complementarities over the 
product set v, up to V, if  
 
 
$29p
$p&$p  `V F 0,  A >, M\[ ll V _mn 0 F  V  F  V 3.12 
 
applies. As a consequence of this, the marginal costs of producing any particular 
product decrease weakly if the quantities of all other products increase. Economies 
of scope at V with respect to all partitions of v is then given, if a twice-differentiable 
multiproduct cost function exhibits weak cost complementarities over v, up to V. 
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Thus cost complementarities are a sufficient condition for economies of scope 
whereas the reverse does not apply.  
If product-specific fixed costs are involved, the multiproduct cost function can be 
written as `V    w  4  V with `V being non differentiable along the relevant 
axes and w  X e v | V  7 0^. A more confirmed proposition than the one mentioned 
before 3.12 is the following: If V is a twice-differentiable function, which exhibits 
weak cost complementarities over v, up to V, and if furthermore  is not 
superadditive (i.e. w 4  W L w  W 0 w, W | v), then economies of scope at V 7  0 with respect to all partitions of v occur. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Multiproduct economies of scale and scope are important concepts for multiproduct 
cost functions. Hence they play a significant role in merger decisions. The mere 
possibility of the exhibition of economies of scope represents an incentive for 
specialized firms to merge and to become multiproduct firms. Moreover, the 
possibility of extracting economies of scale or a potential expansion of already 
existing scale economies due to a merger will also be included into merger 
considerations.  
 
 
As aforementioned, hospitals are special multiproduct firms because measuring the 
units of their outputs is – at first sight – a rather complex matter. The next chapter will 
deal with this problem. 
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4 Hospital Outputs and their Units of Measurement 
Hospital outputs are the most important variables to include into a hospital cost 
function. Thus I will focus on the questions what the outputs of a hospital are and 
how they can be measured. For the sake of completeness, chapter 5 will show which 
other variables shall be included into a hospital cost function, so that in chapter 6 an 
analysis of hospital mergers using an appropriate hospital cost function can be given.  
 
It is often difficult to measure different outputs from a service sector in general and 
hospitals in particular. Patients who want to improve their health status represent an 
output which is really hard to measure. A somewhat easier concept to quantify the 
output is to measure the treatment a hospital provides. For treatments hospitals are 
forced to combine different inputs (e.g.: diagnostic tests, nursing services, drugs, 
meals) to provide a diagnosis to cure the patient’s illness or at least medicate its 
symptoms. As can be seen in chapter 5, it is also necessary to include these different 
inputs into the hospital cost function. 
 
 
One can distinguish between four broad categories of hospital outputs:  
 
• Inpatient Treatment 
Patients who have to stay in the hospital while they obtain a treatment 
 
• Outpatient Treatment 
A treatment for persons who are not staying in the hospital 
 
• Teaching 
The existence of a doctor and/or nurse education 
 
• Research 
Expanding the stock of knowledge in medicine 
 
 
In economics literature, authors mostly focus on inpatient treatment since this output 
category is the largest and also most important one. In addition to inpatient treatment 
also the outpatient treatment is often included into hospital cost functions, to allow for 
a more realistic approximation of hospital costs. 
The teaching status can be included into the hospital cost function through a dummy 
variable. Nevertheless, Butler37 and also Cowing & Holtmann38 note that including the 
teaching status is not important when estimating a hospital cost function.  
During my literature study I did not find any evidence for research as an important 
factor being included in a hospital cost function. Hence I assume that research is not 
relevant for the adopted hospital cost function in chapter 6. Moreover, research is 
mostly done in large university hospitals which are rarely involved into mergers. 
 
 
                                            
37
 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995) 
38
 Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G.: Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical Evidence 
and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data (1983) 
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The treatment concept represents a given time period of hospitalization. Over this 
period the volume of output produced can be measured through two possible 
indicators: The number of patients discharged or the number of cases treated.  
 
4.1 The Unit of Measurement – Cases vs. Days 
Between authors who estimated hospital cost functions no consensus has been 
reached whether cases or days shall be used as the unit of measurement for the 
outputs. Lave & Lave39 and Cowing & Holtmann40 assumed the number of patient 
days as being representative whereas Butler41 and Schreyögg42 used the number of 
cases treated as their appropriate measure. Breyer43 and Evans44 used both 
indicators for their analysis. 
 
By using a patient day as the unit of output measurement, the total output can be 
calculated through the number of patient days over a given time period. 
Nevertheless, the number of cases treated is a more defensible unit of output, since 
patient days could also be seen as inputs to produce a treated case. Furthermore, 
the number of patient days can differ enormously between hospitals which dismiss 
their patients on Fridays and readmit them on Mondays and others which do not 
follow this procedure. Moreover, hospitals trace different strategies how they treat 
their patients: More intensively over a shorter time period or less intensively over a 
longer time span. In both cases the same quantity of output will be produced while 
the number of patient days will vary significantly. 
 
 
The connection between average costs per case o`` and average costs per day o` can be given as: 
 W `   o` `  ·     o`  ·  @ 4.1 
 
The total costs for the )* hospital is given by its average costs per case times the 
number of cases treated, which equals its average costs per day times the total 
number of patient days. This expression can be rewritten as 
 
 o` `   o`  ·  ow _nE[E ow   && 4.2 
 
The average costs per case for hospital  are given by the average costs per day 
times the average length of stay. The relationship 4.2 can also be shown 
graphically: 
 
                                            
39
 Lave J.R., Lave L.B.: Hospital Cost Functions (1970)  
40
 Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G.: Multiproduct Short –Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical Evidence 
and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data (1983)  
41
 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
42
 Schreyögg J.: A Micro-Costing Approach to Estimating Hospital Costs for Appendectomy in a 
Cross-European Context (2008) 
43
 Breyer F.: The Specification of a Hospital Cost Function: A Comment on the Recent Literature 
(1987)  
44
 Evans R.G.: “Behavioural” Cost Functions for Hospitals (1971)  
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Figure 3 shows that the longer the average length of stay the less the average costs 
per day. This can also be seen in the next figure where a hypothetical patient cost 
profile is given: 
 
 
 
 
 
 o represents the fixed costs of admission and discharge,  equals the hotel costs 
and ` are the treatment costs. The length of stay   is 7 days. Figure 4 illustrates that 
the treatment costs are highest at the second day of hospitalization and decline 
afterwards. It can be assumed that the treatment costs in figure 4 are relatively small 
at the first day when often only the admission is arranged.  
 
Figure 3 Average Costs per Day, Average Length of 
Stay and Constant Average Costs per Case Contours 
Butler J.R.G. (1995) 
Figure 4 A hypothetical Patient Cost Profile 
Butler J.R.G. (1995) 
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The total costs of patient  in hospital > can be derived when adding the fixed costs of 
admission and discharge, the hotel costs, and the treatment costs for every day the 
patient is staying in the hospital: 
 
 W `   ∑ o< 4  < 4  `<< !  4.3 
 
The average costs per day are then given by 
 
 
}9&  4.4 
 
where  denotes the length of stay.  
 
 
Returning to figure 3, one will note that the value of the intensity elasticity along the 
average costs per case contour equals –1. This means that the proportionate 
changes in average length of stay and average costs per day are equal but grow in 
opposite directions (i.e. if average length of stay decreases then average costs per 
day increase by the same amount). In reality hospitals are not able to move along a 
given o`` contour, which means that actually   |1|45.  
 
The duration/intensity elasticity of average length of stay with respect to average 
costs per day is given by:  
    ∆ z  z⁄∆ z9  z9⁄  4.5 
 
 
One can conclude that a comparison between hospitals – especially in case of 
productive efficiency – is very difficult if the number of patient days is the chosen 
output unit. If the average length of stay decreases, the average costs per day 
increase. Different average costs per day result only through variation of the length of 
stay. This fact supports the view that the number of cases treated shall be the 
selected output unit. The unsuitability of the number of patient days as dependable 
unit for the measurement of outputs causes conflicting results in various papers for 
the investigation of economies of scale: Carr & Feldstein46 find in their analysis of 
3147 non-profit general hospitals in the U.S. that economies of scale in the hospital 
market occurs up to a given output level. In contrast Ingbar & Taylor47 find an 
inverted U-shaped average cost curve for 72 non-profit hospitals in Massachusetts, 
which indicates, that up to a given output level (in their analysis N  200 beds) 
diseconomies of scale are present. Moreover, Carr & Feldstein48 estimate a 
correlation between costs per day and costs per case of only 0,232. 
 
 
One reason why the number of patient days is used in several studies as the unit of 
output is its simplicity. A treated case on the other hand is not a homogeneous unit of 
output, not even within one single hospital, since different diseases require for 
different quantities and types of inputs (e.g. medication, nursing service, use of 
                                            
45
 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
46
 Carr W.J., Feldstein P.J.: The Relationship of Cost to Hospital Size (1967)  
47
 Ingbar M.L., Taylor L.D.: Hospital Costs in Massachusetts (1968)  
48
 Carr W.J., Feldstein P.J.: The Relationship of Cost to Hospital Size (1967)  
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medical technology equipment, etc.). This results in the necessity to introduce the 
concept of case mix: When estimating hospital cost functions, specific data assigned 
to specific types of illnesses has to be available to take the case mix into account. 
Since these hospital data are not always easily available, the number of patient days 
is often the only left output choice to estimate these functions. 
 
4.2 Case Mix 
As mentioned above, the number of cases treated is the preferable unit of output, but 
it is obvious that not all treatments belong to the same class of output. Treating a 
patient with e.g. tonsillitis is less intensive and costly than treating a patient who is 
afflicted with cancer. Thus it is important to include variables for the case mix in the 
regression analysis for estimating a hospital cost function. These variables account 
for the mix of cases treated by a hospital and hence describe how these different 
groups of illnesses influence the costs of the hospital. It has to be noted, that the 
case mix varies between, but not within hospitals (i.e. every hospital treats different 
cases). Furthermore, the selected case mix is fixed over a given estimation period. 
Two possibilities exist to distinguish between different outputs in the hospital cost 
function: The case mix classification scheme and the case mix index.  
 
4.2.1 The Case Mix Classification Scheme 
The two most widely used case mix classification schemes are the international 
classification of diseases T` and the diagnosis-related groups I.  
 
The so called T` codes are published by the World Health Organization and 
represent the most detailed disease classification available. The T` codes refer to a 
set of possible output categories of a hospital, containing 17 major chapter headings. 
These major headings are fragmented into around 1000 categories of 3-digit codes 
and into more than 1000 categories of 4-digit codes. Currently the 9)* revision of the 
codes T`– 9 of the international statistical classification of diseases, injuries and 
causes of death is being published.  
 
 
Another approach to cover the case mix classification scheme is the diagnosis-
related groups which are “perhaps the most well known and widely applied case-mix 
measures”49. The diagnosis-related groups define different case types, whereas each 
of these types is expected to receive similar outputs or services from a hospital. The 
original version of the I included 83 major diagnostic categories x` based 
on primary diagnosis. These x` were subdivided into more homogeneous groups 
resulting in 383 patient classes. There is also a revised and medically more 
meaningful version of the I present. It comprises 23 major diagnostic groups, 
mostly defined in terms of the organ system affected. At the moment 467 I and 
also 3 additional patient classes – for patients who had surgical procedures which 
were unrelated to their principal diagnosis – exist. 
 
 
The primary problem of the T` codes and also I is that within every group, 
heterogeneity of cases treated is present. It is also obvious that both methods 
                                            
49
 Hornbrook M.C.: Hospital Case Mix: Its Definition, Measurement and Use: Part II (1982) 
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contain too many output categories for statistical estimations of hospital cost 
functions. For that reason the concept of the scalar case mix indices will be 
explained.  
 
4.2.2 The Scalar Case Mix Indices 
A scalar case mix index obtains the possibility for a single-valued measurement of 
the output composition of a hospital. Because of the multiproduct nature of the 
hospital, an index through the use of weights incorporated into an output aggregator 
function ( a linear or non-linear weighted sum of individual outputs) has to be 
constructed. The weights are used to reflect the heterogeneity between different case 
mix categories.  
Hornbrook50 notices, that such an index consists of three components: A case mix 
classification scheme (see section 4.2.1), a weighting scheme which is necessary to 
establish relativities between the different case types to allow for meaningful 
aggregation, and a linear or non-linear aggregation formula. 
 
 
The most well known scalar case mix index is the one introduced by Evans & 
Walker51 and is named “The Information Theory Index”. There the method is the 
following: 
 
The proportion of the cases of the )* hospital which are falling into the >)* diagnostic 
category is given by    &8&. and the proportion of cases of the >)* type which are 
treated in the )* hospital are given by    &8.. There are also several conditions 
implemented: ∑    ∑   1, ∑   A 1, ∑   A 1.   
The proportion of all cases treated in the )* hospital is defined as    8&.8  and the 
proportion that all cases are falling in the >)* category is given by    8.8 .  
The corresponding matrix with the hospital case mix data is shown in table 1 (p.33). 
 
 
Moreover, Evans & Walker defined two information measures for the >)* case type: 
 
 S!   ∑  ln  '&G   4.6 
 
 SK   ∑  ln '&&    4.7 
 
The logarithmic term shows the information gain from learning that the event !: (i.e. all 
hospitals treat an equal proportion of case type >) or  respectively (i.e. all cases of 
type > are treated in the )* hospital) took place.  
 
The term ∑   represents the probability that case type > is treated in hospital . The 
information gain in the first formula 4.6 is equal to zero due to the same case 
                                            
50
 Hornbrook M.C.: Hospital Case Mix: Its Definition, Measurement and Use: Part II (1982) 
51
 Evans R.D., Walker H.D.: Information Theory and the Analysis of Hospital Cost Structure (1972)  
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distribution among all hospitals. This can be displayed by substituting     !: into 
equation 4.6, which results for the logarithmic term and thus for the information gain 
in l 1    0. The more distinct the distribution of cases among hospitals, the higher 
the information gain.  
 
 
Table 1 Hospital Case Mix Data 
Butler J.R.G. (1995) 
 
 
In the next step the authors standardize the two information measures (4.6 and 4.7) 
to obtain a mean of unity:  
 S¡!¢¢¢¢   £G∑ £G'  4.8 
 
 S¡K¢¢¢¢   £2∑ £2'  4.9 
 
Moreover, S¡!¢¢¢¢ and S¡K¢¢¢¢ are used as weights in a linear aggregation formula to produce 
two indices which represent the relative complexity of a hospitals case load:  
 
 f!   ∑ S¡! ¢¢¢¢   4.10 
 
 fK   ∑ S¡K¢¢¢¢   4.11 
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These two measurements (4.10 and 4.11) – i.e. weighted sums of case mix 
proportions to measure the various outputs – can now be used for estimating hospital 
cost functions.  
 
 
The major advantage of case mix indices is that, unlike the T` codes or I they 
reduce the dimensionality of the data. Furthermore, these indices can be applied to 
any case mix classification scheme. Nevertheless, there is also a major 
disadvantage: It is possible that the index shows identical values for hospitals with 
various underlying case mixes.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter deals with the problem which unit of output shall be chosen together 
with the question how different hospital outputs can be measured. The decision 
which unit of output shall be preferred is relatively straight sailing: Since patient days 
differ enormously between hospitals, the number of cases treated is a more robust 
variable, especially for comparison of different hospital costs with each other. The 
flaw is that not all cases treated are equal. Consequently, the concept of case mix 
has to be applied, and hence detailed information about different diseases and their 
treatment is required. Estimating hospital cost functions, the case mix can be 
represented via the case mix classification schemes or the scalar case mix indices. 
The use of the case mix classification scheme seems to be simpler but requires a 
large number of explanatory variables. However, when using the scalar case mix 
indices, the number of explanatory variables will be noticeable reduced while it is 
possible that identical values for hospitals with different outputs treated occur. 
 
 
After having specified the output unit to be used and having discussed the possible 
approaches to measure hospital outputs, I want to show in the next chapter, that 
different authors deal with different units of outputs when estimating hospital cost 
functions. In addition, they also use unequal variables to explain the variation in 
hospital costs. Before analyzing the effects of a horizontal merger, I will thus 
investigate which variables are necessary to be included into these cost functions.  
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5 Hospital Cost Functions 
Numerous authors52 have estimated hospital cost functions in order to specify the 
factors that influence costs. While different approaches have been implemented (as 
discussed in chapter 4) no consensus has been reached on the preferred unit of 
output to be taken.  
Some authors use the number of patient days as the dependent variable whereas 
others prefer the number of cases treated. As noted above, this difference results 
from the availability of data. Nevertheless, the choice of variables used to explain 
hospital costs is a question at issue. In this chapter I will describe the hospital cost 
function according to Butler53, which differs from the hospital cost functions estimated 
by Cowing & Holtmann54, Sinay & Campbell55, or Wang & Zhao & Mahmood56 
respectively. Although the hospital cost functions estimated by the last-mentioned 
authors are very similar, the regression outputs provide different results which 
variables are appropriate for the explanation of variations in hospital costs. After 
having identified the relevant explanatory variables for a hospital cost function by 
comparing the different statistical significances of the estimated coefficients, a 
hospital cost function for the analysis will be assumed in chapter 6. 
 
Breyer57 identifies two approaches to formulate hospital cost functions: The ad-hoc 
specification and the flexible functional form. The simplest form of the ad-hoc 
specification is the additive-linear one. In this case the vector of all explanatory 
variables of the n)* hospital can be described as *  *, … , * with, for instance, 
the bed size of the hospital (to specify the capacity), the case mix, the wage level of 
hospital employees, dummy variables for the teaching status (a measurement of 
quality), the average length of stay or the case flow rate (the number of cases treated 
per bed per year) being included. The cost per case or per patient day for hopital n is 
then given by  
 
 `*   ¤ 4  ∑ * 4  ]* !  5.1 
 
with  being the structural parameters to be estimated. The ad-hoc specification is 
restricted by the different linear and additive seperable cost determinants. That 
means an additional day of care raises the costs by a fixed amount without any 
consideration of the hospital’s capacity and utilization (i.e. constant returns to scale 
are assumed).  
 
 
The second approach introduced by Breyer to estimate a hospital cost function is via 
a flexible functional formderived from microeconomic theory. It indicates that the cost 
function represents the minimum costs for the production of a given volume of output 
                                            
52
 E.g.: Lave J.R., Lave L.B.: Hospital Cost Functions (1970), Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis 
(1995), Wang J., Zhao Z., Mahmood A.: Relative Efficiency, Scale Effect, and Scope Effect of Public 
Hospitals: Evidence from Australia (2006)  
53
 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
54
 Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G.: Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical Evidence 
and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data (1983)  
55
 Sinay U., Campbell C.: Scope and Scale Economies in Merging Hospitals Prior to Merger (1995)  
56
 Wang J., Zhao Z., Mahmood A.: Relative Efficiency, Scale Effect, and Scope Effect of Public 
Hospitals: Evidence from Australia (2006)  
57
 Breyer F.: The Specification of a Hospital Cost Function: A Comment on the Recent Literature 
(1987)  
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as a function of exogenous input prices. The explanatory variables contain only 
output quantities and input prices. In addition, the neoclassical production theory 
suggests that this cost function fulfills all the properties mentioned at the beginning of 
chapter 2. The general formula of a flexible functional form is given by 
 
 ¥`   ¤ 4 ∑ M 4  !K ∑ ∑ ¦MM !5 !5 !  5.2 
 ¦   ¦   0 , > 
 
where ` represents the total costs and , … ,  are the explanatory variables. 
Breyer also noted that the most commonly used form of the general formula is the 
translog (i.e. transcendental logarithmic) one. In this case ¥`    l ` and M ln . A flaw in the use of the translog cost function is the fact that a zero value for 
any explanatory variable is inadmissible since the logarithm of 0 is undefined. This 
means that all hospitals have to produce positive amounts of all outputs. On the other 
hand it is possible to test for economies of scale by incorporating appropriate 
parametric restrictions58 when using this function. The simplest representation of a 
flexible functional form is given by a quadratic formula where ¥`    ` and M  .  
 
For all flexible functional forms another restriction has to be taken into account. Due 
to the numerous variables needed an accurate reflection of the patient’s 
heterogeneity (via case mix) is difficult to handle in a flexible functional form model 
(e.g.: using a translog cost function § 4  ·  4  4 1/ 2© parameters have to be 
estimated for  outputs and  inputs59). 
 
 
In economics literature, several approaches for the estimation of hospital cost 
functions have been published. In the following section, the different estimation 
procedures in general and the specific variables included in particular shall be 
evaluated. This investigation will provide the base for the accomplishment of the 
merger analysis in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
 
5.1 Estimated Hospital Cost Functions 
One can distinguish between short-run and long-run cost functions. Generally, in the 
short-run some input factors are fixed whereas in the long-run all inputs are variable. 
Butler60 estimates both versions using the number of beds  to capture the size of 
a hospital. A hospital’s capacity to accommodate patients is given by the rated bed 
days: 
 I   365  5.3 
 
Due to the fact that hospital beds are normally not homogeneous and thus not 
perfectly substitutable, this approch must be regarded as simplification (e.g.: a bed at 
the intensive care is connected with a higher treatment than a bed at the maternity 
ward).  
                                            
58
 See Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
59
 See Brown R.S., Caves D.W., Christensen L.R.: Modelling the Structure of Cost and Production for 
Multiproduct Firms (1979)  
60
 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
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Butler also uses the case flow rate, defined as the number of cases treated per bed 
per year as an explanatory variable to define the average costs per case: 
 
 `I   pª 5.4 
 
The occupancy rate, which is also used in his regression analysis, can be described 
by the occupied bed days (« – a hospital’s total number of occupied bed days per 
year) and the rated bed days (see 5.3): 
 
 «``   ¬ªyª 5.5 
 
The case flow rate and the occupancy rate are linked bythe following relationship: 
 
 `I   ¬99z  · 365 5.6 
 
where ow stands for average length of stay and is given by: 
 
 ow   ¬ªp  5.7 
 
The case flow rate has a maximum value of 365 which represents an occupancy rate 
of one (i.e. 100 %), and the average length of stay being its minimum value of one 
day. An increase in the number of cases treated per bed per year   `I can be 
caused by an increase in the occupancy rate and/or a reduction in the average length 
of stay. These possible changes induce also differences between hospitals in 
marginal costs of treating an additional patient. 
 
5.1.1 Ad-hoc Specifications 
For his empirical studies Butler61 uses a linear total cost function which refers to the 
group of ad-hoc specifications (described at the beginning of chapter 5). This function 
can be formulated as follows: 
 
 `   ∑ V  5.8 
  denotes the average and marginal costs of product ,  and V denotes the number 
of cases treated in the )* diagnostic category. The total output V is given by: 
 
 V   ∑ V  5.9 
 
 
Due to the arguments stated in section 4.1, the author uses the average costs per 
case as the unit of output: 
 o``   9p   ∑   5.10 
 
The average costs per case correspond to the ray average costs described in section 
3.2 and  
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 Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
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   p&∑ p&&  5.11 
 
measures the hospital’s proportion in each diagnostic category.  
 
If  does not change as the total volume of cases treated differ, then the average 
costs per case remain constant, meaning that there are overall constant returns to 
scale. 
 
 
To allow for scale effects, Butler includes rated bed days and rated bed days squared 
into the above defined cost function (5.8): 
 
 `   ∑ V 4  [!I 4  [KIK !    /: V 5.12 
 
o``   ∑  4  [! ®yªp ¯ 4  [K ®yª2p ¯ !   
 
   ∑  4  [! ®CDP9°y¯ 4  [K ®CDP·yª9°y ¯ !  5.13 
 
In order to avoid the problem that a reduction in the average length of stay increases 
the number of cases treated per bed per year62 (see 5.6 for the relationship), Butler 
also includes average length of stay into the equation. Furthermore, the author 
includes the number of beds in linear and quadratic terms as independent variables 
to possibly obtain a conventional U-shaped cost curve: 
 
 o``   ∑  4  [! ®CDP9°y¯ 4  [K ®CDP·yª9°y ¯ 4  [C ow 4  [B  ! 4  [P K 5.14 
 
 
Schuttinga63 recommends, that the average length of stay shall not be included in an 
average cost function because an additional day spend in a hospital also depends on 
the price charged. Consequently, the average length of stay is not an exogeneous 
variable. 
 
 
For one of his numerous empirical analyses Butler uses data from 121 public 
hospitals in Queensland (Australia) for the years 1977 –  1978 together with 17 and 47 diagnostic categories respectively to account for the case mix.  
 
Butler observes that size as the only explanatory variable is very poor for explaining 
average costs (IK¢¢¢¢  0,06). When estimating equation (5.14) the parameters of  and K are statistically significant which means that economies of scale are present (see 
table 264). The regression output also indicates that using 47 diagnostic categories ` explains the variation in the average costs per case better than using 17 
categories. Thus, one can conclude that the more aggregated the case mix 
classification scheme, the less is its explanatory power. 
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 Which certainly results in different costs. 
63
 See Butler J.R.G.: Hospital Cost Analysis (1995)  
64
 The first term of 5.14 is not shown in the regresson output. 
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Butler also finds a U-shaped average cost curve for the long-run with the minimum 
point at 469 beds. Furthermore, the author states that a higher case flow rate 
demands a higher number of beds to obtain economies of scale. One should note 
that re-estimating equation (5.14) with other specifications weakens the evidence of 
scale effects and also the long-run U-shaped average cost curve. 
 
In addition, Butler demonstrates that an increase in the case flow rate will reduce the 
average costs per case by a greater amount if it is caused by a reduction of the 
average length of stay rather than by an increase in the occupancy rate. 
Furthermore, a reduction in the average costs per case is larger for smaller intial 
case flow rates.  
 
 
Input price differences are one possible reason for cost variations between hospitals 
(e.g.: regional differences in the wage rates). Butler suggests that the variation in 
average costs per case due to different input prices is minimal and therefore not 
included in his analysis. 
 
He also compares costs of teaching and non-teaching public hospitals in 
Queensland. When accounting for teaching in the cost function it is important to 
review the case mix variations because teaching hospitals treat a more expensive 
and complex case mix. Teaching hospitals may also generate higher costs since they 
are confronted with indirect teaching costs due to the learning process and the 
necessity to provide the newest equipment for academic purpose. Moreover, 
teaching hospitals are generally larger in size and thus treat a higher number of 
inpatients in comparison with non-teaching hospitals.  
The most common approach to identify teaching and non-teaching hospitals is to 
include dummy variables in the regression equation. After including the teaching 
dummy variables in his analysis and adjusting for the case mix and all other relevant 
factors, Butler concludes that the teaching status has virtually no impact on the 
hospital costs. He states that most of the arising expenses are common costs and 
not seperable teaching costs. 
 
Table 2 Regression Output 
Butler J.R.G. (1995) 
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In addition to the comparison of teaching and non-teaching hospitals, differences in 
costs between public and private hospitals have to be taken into account for further 
investigations. Butler uses data from 120 public and 38 private65 hospitals in 
Queensland (non-profit and profit which are regulated by the government) for the 
years 1977 –  1978. He finds that though private hospitals are smaller in size 
compared to public ones, they discharge the same number of patients. Private 
hospitals also show a shorter average length of stay and a higher occupancy rate. 
This results in a higher case flow rate and in turn implies, that private hospitals have 
lower average costs per case. There are also significant differences between public 
and private hospitals with respect to the case types treated. Butler states that it is 
common practice for profit-orientated hospitals to choose case types with relatively 
high price-cost margins and leave all other case types to be treated by non-profit or 
public hospitals.  
Having estimated equations with different specifications he arrives at the conclusion 
that the average costs per case are substantially lower in private hospitals due to the 
differences in the case mix treated.  
 
 
As a matter of course Butler is not the only author who estimates hospital cost 
functions66. The majority of these authors do not choose Butler’s approach of an ad-
hoc specification, but estimate a flexible functional form. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, the most widely used specification of flexible functional 
forms is the translog cost function.  
 
5.1.2 Flexible Functional Forms - Translog Cost Functions 
Cowing & Holtmann67 estimate a multiproduct translog variable cost function with 
data from 138 New York State general-care hospitals (non-profit and profit) for the 
year 1975. They use patient days as their unit of output. 
 
The short-run variable cost function which minimizes the variable hospital costs can 
be written as: `±  h, ², ³, o where h is the vector of outputs, ² is the vector of 
variable input prices, ³ is the vector of fixed capital inputs, and o represents the fixed 
admitting physician inputs.  
The long-run costs are then given by: `   `±h, ², ³, o 4  ´ ³ 4  z o  where ´ 
specifies the user costs of capital and z describes the price of admitting physician 
services. The last two terms of the cost function represent the fixed costs. Since the 
short-run variable cost function has already been minimized, the envelope conditions 
for long-run cost minimizing behavior are given as follows: 
 
 
$ 9µ
$ ´    ´ 5.15 
 
 
$ 9µ
$ z    z 5.16 
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 Specific data for 3 of 38 private hospitals available; data for 35 hospitals aggregated. 
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 E.g.: Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G.: Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical 
Evidence and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data (1983), Sinay U., Campbell C.: Scope and 
Scale Economies in Merging Hospitals Prior to Merger (1995), Lave J.R., Lave L.B.: Hospital Cost 
Functions (1970)  
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 Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G.: Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical Evidence 
and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data (1983)  
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This means that if the result of 5.15 is greater than  ´ over-investment in capacity 
and equipment occurs.  
 
Cowing & Holtmann take the following short-run (using the quantity of capital as a 
fixed input) translog variable cost function as basis for their estimations: 
 ln `±   0 4 ∑ [ ln h[ 4 12  ∑ ∑ [ ln h[ ln h 4 ∑ ¦ ln #[[  
 4 !K  ∑ ∑ ¦ ln ² ln ² 4  ¶´ ln ³ 4  ¶´´ ln ³K 4  ·z ln o  
 4 ·zz ln oK 4  ∑ ∑ ¸¹ ln h¹ ln ² 4  ∑ º¹ ln h¹ ln ³¹¹  
 4 ∑ »¹ ln h¹ ln o 4  ∑ ¼ ln ² ln ³ 4 ∑  ln ² ln o¹  
 4 ¶³o ln ³ ln o 5.17 
 h respresents a vector of 5 diagnostic categories: Emergency room care, medical-
surgical care, pediatric care, maternity care and other care. ² contains 6 variable 
input prices for nursing labor, professional labor, administrative labor, general labor, 
materials, and supplies. ³ is a single measure of a fixed capital stock and o represents the number of fixed admitting physicians in each hospital. In addition, 
Cowing & Holtmann add dummy variables in their regression analysis to distinguish 
between teaching and non-teaching hospitals as well as between profit and non-profit 
hospitals. 
 
In order to have a variable cost function being homogeneous of degree 1 (if doubling 
all input prices the total variable costs will double) Cowing & Holtmann restrict the 
following parameters: 
 
 
∑ ¦  1,     ∑ ¸¹  0,     ∑ ¦  0,     ∑ ¼  0,     ∑   0 5.18 
 
 
Cowing & Holtmann’s estimation results of 5.17 are given below: 
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Having estimated equation 5.17 Cowing & Holtmann find that the hospitals are not 
in their long-run equilibrium: 130 of 138 hospitals are confronted with over-
capitalization because the estimated coefficient for the variable capital is positive, 
whereas equation 5.15 requires the coeffient to be negative. In addition, the 
estimated coefficient for the number of admitting physicians is positive, meaning that 
reducing the number of physicians will result in lower costs. This can also be seen in 
equation 5.16, where a negative coefficient is required. Nevertheless, table 3 shows 
that the coefficant for the variable ]ZE[ \M @mm¥ nV is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 
Cowing & Holtmann as well as Butler (see section 5.1.1) find that profit hospitals 
have lower costs compared to non-profit hospitals (see variable proprietary). They 
also confirm Butler’s finding that the teaching status is not important if estimating 
hospital cost functions. The regression output from Cowing & Holtmann also show 
statistically significant parameter estimates for 3 of 5 diagnostic output categories 
and 2 significant coefficient estimates for the output categories in squared terms. On 
the other hand table 3 indicates that none of the parameter estimates for the cross 
products of the output categories are different from zero.  
 
The authors also state, that all parameter estimates for the input prices are 
statistically highly significant just as most of the coefficients for the squared terms of 
the input prices. 8 of 15 coefficient estimates for the cross products of the input prices 
are different from zero. Contrary to the estimated coefficient from capital, the number 
Table 3 Estimation Results 
Cowing T.G., Holtmann A.G. (1983) 
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of admitting physicians has no significant influence on the costs. There are only a few 
significant coefficient estimates for the cross products of the output categories and 
the input prices. Cowing & Holtmann can not find significant parameter estimates for 
the cross products of the output categories or capital, and also no significant 
estimates for the cross products of the output categories or the number of admitting 
physicians.  
 
 
Sinay & Campbell68 also estimate a short-run translog variable cost function for 202 
hospitals which are going to be subject to a merger one year later (merging 
hospitals), and for another 202 hospitals where this was not going to be the case 
(control hospitals). The authors state that the control hospitals are comparable with 
the merging hospitals in both size and ownership and are furthermore located in the 
same market area. Since most of the hospitals involved in mergers are located in or 
around the same local areas the last attribute is of particular importance, though the 
available data in the U.S. for the years 1987 –  1989 are taken from a nationwide 
sample. Just as Cowing & Holtmann, the authors use patient days as their unit of 
output, whereas Butler uses the number of cases treated. 
 
Sinay & Campbell use the following short-run translog variable cost function for their 
analysis: 
 ln `±   ¤ 4  ∑  ln h 4  ∑ ∑ ¹ ln h ln h¹ 4  ∑ ¦ ln ½¹  
 4 ∑ ∑ ¦ ln ½ ln ½ 4 ∑ ∑ · ln h ln ½ 4  º´ ln w  
 4 !K  º´´ ln wK 4  ∑ ¾ ln h ln w 4  ∑ ¸ ln ½ ln w  
 4 ¦J¹ wI¿xTf 4  ¦¹À I«TW 4  ¦p whwWx 4  @! Áxxh86 
 4 @K Áxxh87 4  @C Áxxh 88 4 E 5.19 
 h denotes the set of patient care output: Acute care days, intensive care days, sub 
acute care days, and outpatient visits. ½ reflects the input prices of labor and 
supplies, and w are the number of available beds which should represent the 
fixed capital. wI¿xTf is an index to account for the different services offered by the 
hospital and whwWx is a dummy variable to identify if the given hospital is a member 
in a multi-hospital system. I«TW is a dummy variable for the proprietary status and Áxxh86 – Áxxh88 are dummy variables to control for differences in total 
variable costs over time.  
 
Sinay & Campbell also introduce parameter restrictions to obtain a variable cost 
function being homogeneous of degree 1: 
 
 
∑ ¦  1,     ∑ ¦  0,     ∑ ·  0,     ∑ ¸  0 5.20 
 
 
 
Their parameter estimates for merging and control hospitals are shown in table 4: 
 
 
                                            
68
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In their analysis the authors find that the parameter estimates for all 4 output 
categories are highly statistically significant for merging and control hospitals. Also 
the coefficient estimates for the squared terms of the output categories are nearly all 
relevant for both hospital types. Moreover, parameter estimates for the cross 
products of the diverse output rubrics are mostly statistically significant for merging 
hospitals. In addition, the input prices in linear and squared terms seem to be 
important when estimating a variable cost function. Also the estimates for the 
variables _¥E · @MME[Em \]m]m mE¥\[E are nearly all statistically significant for 
merging and control hospitals whereas the estimates for ]lE · \]m]m []Z[ 
seem to play no significant role in the estimation process. 
The estimated positive coefficient for beds is highly significant for merging hospitals 
but not for the control hospitals whereas the coefficient for ZE@K is only relevant for 
control hospitals. The estimated coefficients for the variables ]Z ]mE [E @V ·w and \]mmEm um · w are significant at a 5 % level for both hospital 
types but all other variables including w are not relevant for the analysis. 
Table 4 Parameter Estimates 
Sinay U., Campbell C. (1995) 
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The coefficients for the variables wI¿xTf, I«TW, and whwWx are all statistically 
insignificant for both hospital types. Futhermore, there are only two significant 
coefficients for the year dummy variables of the control hospitals. 
The estimate regression from Sinay & Campbell show an IK of more than 98 % for 
merging and control hospitals. 
 
 
Sinay & Campbell also investigate whether or not economies of scale apply to the 
estimated variable cost function69. For their analysis they classify merging and control 
hospitals into 3 sizes: mean size, large size (2 times mean size), and small size (0,5  
times mean size).  
The authors find that merging mean sized hospitals are confronted with 
diseconomies of scale whereas for the mean sized control hospitals economies of 
scale occur. As a result one can conclude that merging (mean sized) hospitals can 
become more efficient if they will proportionately reduce all outputs. Futhermore, it 
indicates that these hospitals do not benefit from the larger size after the merger.  
For large hospitals, both types – merging and control hospitals – show diseconomies 
of scale. Small hospitals on the other hand show economies of scale with higher 
scale effects for control hospitals.  
 
 
 
Sinay70 also estimates a similar translog variable cost function just as the one shown 
under (5.19). Instead of year dummy variables, he includes 6 regional dummy 
variables, a variable for the year trend and a variable for the market size subject to 
the hospital’s location. The major difference between this approach and the one 
given under 5.19 is the time frame of investigation: In addition to data 1 year before 
the merger, Sinay estimates the variable cost function for merging and control 
hospitals based on data generated 1 and 2 years after the merger. The estimation 
results for the merging and control hospitals are shown in table 5 and table 6: 
 
 
As regards the coefficient estimates of the output categories for merging and control 
hospitals these estimation results match those described above. In contrast, the 
coefficients of the output rubrics in squared terms estimated by Sinay and shown in 
table 5 (control hospitals) differ in significance from those estimated by Sinay & 
Campbell. The parameter estimates for the cross products of the output categories 
are mostly not statistically significant for merging hospitals but significant for control 
hospitals 1 year before the merger and 1 year after a merger. To include the inputs in 
linear and squared terms into the regression analysis seems to be as relevant in this 
case as it is for the estimation output of Sinay & Campbell. This applies also to the 
coefficient of beds, which is again statistically significant, this time for both hospital 
types. However, it is remarkable that the coefficient turns out to be negative only for 
merging hospitals after the merger. It can be seen in table 6 that all variables 
including beds are now more important for control hospitals than for the hospitals 
studied by Sinay & Campbell (see table 4). The dummy variables which account for  
                                            
69
 See chapter 3 for the calculation procedure 
70
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998)  
  
 
 48 
 Hospital Cost Functions 
wI¿xTf, I«TW, and whwWx show no statistical significance for the merging 
hospitals. On the other hand the coefficient for wI¿xTf is now statistically 
significant for the control hospitals. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Regression Results for Merging Hospitals 
Sinay U.T. (1998) 
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Table 6 Regression Results for Control Hospitals 
Sinay U.T. (1998) 
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Wang, Zhao & Mahmood71 estimate a translog variable cost function for large and 
small hospitals (i.e. district hospitals). For their analysis they use data from 114 public 
hospitals in New South Wales (Australia) from the years 1997 –  1998. 
 
Their estimate translog variable cost function includes T variable inputs, W fixed 
factors and v outputs and can be described as follows 
 ln `±+   ¤ 4  ∑  ln _+ 4 ∑ ¦ ln V+ 4  ∑ ¶) ln ?)+}) !8 !: !  
 4 !K  ∑ ∑  ln _+ ln _+ 4  !K  ∑ ∑ ¦5 ln V+ ln V5+85 !8 !: !: !  
 4 !K  ∑ ∑ ¶) ln ?)+ ln ?+ 4 ∑ ∑ Â ln _+ ln V+8 !: !} !}) !  
 4 ∑ ∑ ¸) ln _+ ln ?)+ 4  ∑ ∑ ») ln V+ ln ?)+}) !8 !}) !: !  
 4 ¼  4 u 4 ] 5.21 
 
where _+ repesents the input prices (i.e. the average salary of medical labor services 
and the average salary of non-medical labor inputs), V+ denotes the output levels, 
and ?)+ describes the fixed factors (i.e. the number of average available beds).  is a 
vector which consists of hospital complexity indicators, u is the included error term for 
the output variables, and ] includes other random factors. 
 
 
The authors also restrict the following parameters to get a well defined cost function, 
which has to fulfill the properties mentioned at the beginning of chapter 3. 
 
For a continous cost function in the factor prices and output levels the following 
restrictions are given: 
         0 , 
 ¦5   ¦5     0,  5.22 
 
The request for a homogeneous cost function of degree 1 demands the following 
restrictions: 
 
∑   1,     ∑   0,   1, … , T: !: !  
 
∑ Â  0,         1, … , v: !  
 
∑ ¸)  0,      m  1, … , W: !  5.23 
 
In order to obtain a cost function which is nondecreasing in factor prices and output 
levels, the following properties are given: 
 
   L 0,        1, … , T 
 ¦  L  0,       1, … , v 5.24 
 
 
Wang, Zhao & Mahmood formulate an index for the number of inpatient services and 
an index for the number of occasions of services which they use as an approximation 
for outpatient care. The authors apply these two indices to measure the hospital 
outputs. Therefore they define the case mix inpatient service index as follows: 
                                            
71
 Wang J., Zhao Z., Mahmood A.: Relative Efficiency, Scale Effect, and Scope Effect of Public 
Hospitals: Evidence from Australia (2006)  
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 x*   ∑ ÃÄÅÃÅ  ·  w¢¢¢  5.25 
 
Wang, Zhao & Mahmood denote f as the number of seperations, n is a dummy 
indicator of large or small hospitals, and @ is an index for the diagnostic category. w¢¢¢ 
acts as a weigth reflecting the average length of stay for seperations with conditions 
given by the indices of the diagnostic category. 
 
Looking at the regression output, one has to notice that most of the estimated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant for large and small hospitals. The only 
estimated coefficients which are statistically significant for small hospitals are for the 
variables l[V \M \  E@l lZ\][ ]m, m\ml \\ \M E[uE, and m\ml \\ \M E[uE ·  uE[¥E ulZlE ZE@. The regression output for 
large hospitals shows a similar paradigm while there are a few more significant 
parameter estimates72 (e.g.: average available beds, total occasions of services in 
squared terms, salary of non-medical labor inputs times average available beds). 
Due to the fact that the estimated coefficient for the variable uE[¥E ulZlE ZE@ 
is positive and significant, the authors conclude, that in large hospitals over-
capitalization occurs.  
Considering the numerous statistically insignificant coefficient estimates, it can be 
expected that the resulting IK of 96 % for large hospitals and 95% for small hospitals 
are only due to the large number of explanatory variables included.  
 
The authors conclude that the translog variable cost function for small hospitals is U-
shaped and shows economies of scale until the minimum point of 43 beds is 
reached. The translog variable cost function for large hospitals is also U-shaped with 
the minimum at 175 beds. For both hospital types economies of scope are present.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
As can clearly be seen in the current chapter, numerous authors come to different 
conclusions which variables should be included into a hospital cost function 
(especially when focusing on cross products). Furthermore, the cost function chosen 
for any estimation procedure will not be subject to common consent. There are 
authors who prefer to estimate an ad-hoc specification whereas others concentrate 
on flexible functional forms. However, looking at the regression outputs described 
above it can be seen, that there is no disagreement about the question whether 
different output categories and input prices shall be included into a hospital cost 
function. By including fixed factors into the cost function (e.g.: the number of 
avialable beds) the regression results can be improved.  
 
 
Having investigated the relevant factors to be included into a hospital cost function 
(i.e. output categories in linear and squared terms including the cross products; the 
input prices in linear and squared terms and the cross products of the input prices 
with the output categories; the number of available beds) I can now continue in 
chapter 6 to conduct the merger analysis of the hospital market. 
 
                                            
72
 7 parameter estimates of 27 are statistically significant. 
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6 Merger Analysis of the Hospital Sector 
In the previous chapters all aspects providing the base of a horizontal merger 
analysis of the hospital sector have been discussed. While horizontal mergers 
between single product firms were introduced in chapter 2, chapter 3 gave a brief 
recapitulation of cost functions of multiproduct firms such as hospitals. In chapters 4 
and 5 the units of outputs and their measurement were defined, and the general 
layout of a hospital cost function was analyzed. 
 
In this last chapter a merger analysis of the hospital sector will be given. The main 
focus of this analysis is on the changes in costs and profits which might occur as a 
result of a merger. The general approach is similar to the one in chapter 2, though in 
the current chapter the multiproduct case instead of the single product case will be 
analyzed. For the purpose of calculation a hospital cost function will be assumed.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, I suppose that Cournot competition is an accurate method for 
describing the hospital market particularly in Europe, where a broad public health 
insurance system is available. Therefore hospitals and hospital wards are assumed 
to compete in quantities and not in prices. 
 
In the following analysis I distinguish between two cases: A merger between hospital 
units and a merger between hospitals. For the first case – a merger between hospital 
wards – it is assumed that all three hospital units in the market produce exactly the 
same outputs (i.e. they are producing perfect substitutes). Furthermore it is assumed 
that hospital wards 2 and 3 are going to merge and that no capacity constraints exist. 
Since all three hospital units produce homogeneous outputs, only two of the three 
hospital wards will remain in the market after a merger has taken place.  
A different situation occurs for two merging hospitals: In this case we may assume 
that all three hospitals in the market produce differentiated outputs (subject to their 
size, location, operator, level of specialization, etc). This means that each hospital in 
the market produces outputs with none of them being exactly equal to the others. 
Therefore, if a merger between hospitals 2 and 3 takes place a new hospital x, 
which will going to produce the different outputs of both hospitals, will arise. 
 
 
The  output matrix of the hospital sector is given by: 
 
    
ÆÇ
ÇÇ
È !! …  ! … !É! Ê
É  É 5! … 5 …
  É 5ËÌ
ÌÌ
Í
 6.1 
    1, … , , denotes the different hospitals or hospital wards respectively >   1, … , , represents the different outputs 
 
For simplicity I assume that only 3 hospitals or hospital units are present in the 
hospital market, so that there is still some competition after a merger. Furthermore, 
each hospital (unit) is producing 2 outputs. The output matrix of the hospital market 
therefore becomes a 32 matrix: 
 
  
 
 54 
 Merger Analysis of the Hospital Sector 
    Î!! !KK! KKC! CKÏ 6.2 
 
i.e.:    1, 2, 3, are the different hospitals or hospital units respectively 
 >   1, 2, describes the different outputs produced 
 
 
In chapter 5 the statistical significance of various variables included in hospital cost 
functions is illustrated. As stated in the conclusion it is important to include the 
different output categories as well as the different input prices if working with a 
hospital cost function (both in linear and quadratic terms, and also the cross 
products). The cross products of the input prices with the different output categories 
shall be incorporated as well. Furthermore, the regression results can be improved 
by including fixed factors (e.g. the number of available beds) into the hospital cost 
function.  
 
As described in chapter 5, Sinay73 estimated hospital cost functions for merging and 
control hospitals for the periods 1 year before the merger as well as 1 and 2 years 
after the merger. Table 5 (regression results for merging hospitals) and table 6 
(regression results for control hospitals) illustrate the fact that the estimated 
coefficients will change over these periods. Thus, we assume that cost functions 
which include different coefficients before and after the merger for merging and 
control hospitals respectively hospital wards exist. Moreover, to capture the 
coefficients’ relationship before and after a merger as well as between the estimated 
coefficients, the mean values of the statistically significant coefficients (1 year before 
and 2 years after the merger) estimated by Sinay are used for the calculation74. 
 
6.1 Merger between Hospital Wards 
Examining in particular wards in the hospital market, it can be assumed that they all 
produce exactly the same outputs. This means that each hospital unit provides 
treatments for a narrow area of diseases and hence specialization in the different 
hospital wards occurs.  
 
Suppose that the inverse demand function has the following form: 
 
      ∑ C !  6.3 
 
The linear invese demand function suggests that the price of output > depends on the 
quantity of output > produced in every hospital unit. Since Cournot competition is 
assumed in the hospital market, the function reveals the fact that in this oligopoly 
game quantities of different hospital wards are strategic substitutes. It follows, that if 
any given hospital unit in the market produces more of output >, the price of output > will fall.  7 0 is a constant which indicates that even if there is no treatment of 
output >, the price of output > is positive. 
                                            
73
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998)  
74
 To fulfill the parameter restrictions  ∑ ¦  1,     ∑ ¦  0,     ∑ ·  0,     ∑ ¸  0 (see chapter 5), 
also statistically insignificant coefficients are used to calculate the mean values. This is necessary to 
obtain a cost function which is homogeneous of degree 1.  
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The assumed cost functions for the hospital units are given as follows: 
 
 
• Cost Functions for Control Wards 
 
- Before the Merger: 
 
`  0,1806 ! 4  0,1806 K 4  0,0065 !K 4  0,0065 KK   0,0142 ! K 
 4 0,6441_! 4  0,3559 _K 4  0,1327 _!K   0,0326 _KK   0,1001 _! _K 
 4 0,0096 ! _! 4  0,0096 K _!   0,0096 ! _K   0,0096 K _K 
 4 0,1954 ZE@ 6.4 
 
 
- After the Merger: 
 
`  0,1720 ! 4  0,1720 K 4  0,0066 !K 4  0,0066 KK   0,0069 ! K 
 4 0,6382_! 4  0,3618 _K 4  0,1541 _!K   0,0662 _KK   0,0879 _! _K 
 4 0,0039 ! _! 4  0,0039 K _!   0,0039 ! _K   0,0039 K _K 
 4 0,2272 ZE@ 6.5 
 
 
 
• Cost Functions for Merging Wards 
 
- Before the Merger: 
 `>  0,1637 1 4  0,1637 2 4  0,0178 12 4  0,0178 22   0,0079 1 2 
 4 0,6438 _! 4  0,3562 _K 4  0,1762 _!K   0,0500 _KK   0,1262 _! _K 
 4 0,0032 ! _! 4  0,0032 K _!   0,0032 ! _K   0,0032 K _K 
 4 0,3974 ZE@ 6.6 
 
 
- After the Merger: 
 
`  0,2777 ! 4  0,2777 K   0,0981 !K   0,0981 KK 4  0,0136 ! K 
 4 0,6381_! 4  0,3619 _K 4  0,17623 _!K   0,0033 _KK   0,1796 _! _K 
 4 0,0035 ! _! 4  0,0035 K _!   0,0035 ! _K   0,0035 K _K 
  0,2529 ZE@ 6.7 
 
 
 
The variable ZE@ represents the number of staffed beds in the hospital unit and shall 
reflect the fixed capital. The variable _! describes the average salary, and _K 
denotes the average price of supplies for hospital unit . ! and K are the two 
possible outputs each hospital ward is going to produce. The major difference to the 
single product case is the interaction term !  ·  K where a negative coefficient 
indicates that synergies due to the joint production are present.  
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Furthermore, it is assumed that a merger between hospital units 2 and 3 takes place 
(i.e. hospital unit 1 is a control ward; hospital units 2 and 3 are merging wards).  
 
6.1.1 The Pre-Merger Situation 
As stated above it is assumed that hospitals and hospital units compete in quantities. 
Therefore hospital unit   1, 2, 3 has to maximize its profit function to obtain the 
equilibrium quantities it is going to produce: 
 
 .       ∑ !C !  ! 4    ∑ KC !  K   ` 6.8 
 
 
 
The first order conditions are as follows (note that hospital unit 1 is a control ward, 
and hospital units 2 and 3 are merging wards): 
 
 
- Ward 1: 
 Ð !Ð !!    2!!   K!  C!   0,1806  0,0013 !! 4  0,0142 !K 
  0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.9 
 
 Ð !Ð !K    2!K   KK  CK   0,1806  0,0013 !K 4  0,0142 !! 
  0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.10 
 
 
 
- Ward 2: 
 Ð KÐ K!    2K!   !!   C!   0,1637  0,0036 K! 4  0,0079 KK 
  0,0032 _K! 4  0,0032 _KK  0 6.11 
 
 Ð KÐ KK    2KK   !K   CK   0,1637  0,0036 KK 4  0,0079 K! 
  0,0032 _K! 4  0,0032 _KK  0 6.12 
 
 
 
- Ward 3: 
 Ð CÐ C!    2C!   !!   K!   0,1637  0,0036 C! 4  0,0079 CK 
  0,0032 _C! 4  0,0032 _CK  0 6.13 
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Ð CÐ CK    2CK   !K   KK   0,1637  0,0036 CK 4  0,0079 C! 
  0,0032 _C! 4  0,0032 _CK  0 6.14 
 
 
To solve these first order conditions, symmetry on quantities within each hospital unit 
is assumed. This means, that each hospital unit is producing the same amount of its 
two products, i.e.: 
 !   K 6.15 
 
 
 
After rewriting and solving the first order conditions, the following equilibrium 
quantities are obtained: 
 
 11+   12+  0,2550  4 0,0009 _21   0,0009 _22 4  0,0009 _31   0,0009 _32 
  0,0073 _!! 4  0,0073 _!K   0,0523 6.16 
 
 21+   22+  0,2460   0,0024 _21 4  0,0024 _22 4  0,0008 _31   0,0008 _32 
 4 0,0024 _!!   0,0024 _!K   0,0368 6.17 
 
 31+   32+  0,2460  4 0,0008 _21   0,0008 _22   0,0024 _31 4  0,0024 _32 
 4 0,0024 _!!   0,0024 _!K   0,0368 6.18 
 
 
 
The equilibrium price of output > in the pre-merger period is given by: 
 
 +     ∑ +     !+   K+   C+C !  6.19 
 
 >+  0,2530  4 0,0007 _21   0,0007 _22 4  0,0007 _31   0,0007 _32 
 4 0,0025 _!!   0,0025 _!K 4  0,1259 6.20 
 
 
 
The total output of the three hospital wards is as follows: 
 
 +  2 ·  1>+ 4  2 ·  2>+ 4  2 ·  3>+  6.21 
 +  1,4940    0,0015 _21 4  0,0015 _22   0,0015 _31 4  0,0015 _32 
  0,0050 _!! 4  0,0050 _!K   0,2518 6.22 
 
 
 
For a better comparison between the pre- and post-merger situation as well as for 
the sake of a simpler calculation of the cost and profit functions, concrete values for 
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_!, _K, and ZE@ will be used. Therefore, I suppose that the number of staffed beds 
in a hospital unit equals 30. Furthermore, Sinay75 notes, that the mean value of the 
supply price per patient day is $134 for merging hospitals and $129 for control 
hospitals. He also suggests that the mean value of the salary per employee per year 
is $22.664 for merging hospitals and $21.845 for control hospitals. After some 
calculations76 to obtain variables with the same base (namely patient days), the 
following values are used for the further analysis77: 
 _!!  $ 233,9; _!K  $ 129 _K!  $ 243,6; _KK  $ 134 
 _C!  $ 243,6; _CK  $ 134 6.23 
 
 
Thus, all the equilibrium values given above can be rewritten as follows: 
 
 !!+   !K+  0,2550   0,6220 K!+   KK+  0,2460  4 0,0363 
 C!+   CK+  0,2460  4 0,0363 6.24 
 
 
 +  0,2530  4 0,5490 6.25 
 
 
 +  1,4940   1,0981 6.26 
 
 
 
Using concrete values for the average salary, the average supply price and the 
number of staffed beds, the cost and profit functions of the 3 hospital units can also 
easily be calculated: 
 
 
!`+   0,0001 K 4  0,6033  4 3.898,04 `K+  0,0017 K 4  0,2540  4 5.655,13 
 `C+  0,0017 K 4  0,2540  4 5.655,13 6.27 
 
 !  0,1291 K   0,6381   3.898,04 K  0,1228 K 4  0,0344   5.655,13 
 C  0,1228 K 4  0,0344   5.655,13 6.28 
 
                                            
75
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
76
 Sinay indicates that the supply price is per patient day, whereas the salary is given per employee 
per year. It is known that (total supply prices / total patient days) = 134, so the total patient days can 
be determined since the total supply prices are given in his paper. Having obtained nearly 7.000 
patient days, and given the total wage costs of $ 16.825.788 for merging hospitals and $ 16.037.532 
for control hospitals, the average salary per patient day is $ 243,6 for merging hospitals and $ 233,9 
for control hospitals. 
77
 It can be expected that the average salary and the average supply price don’t differ significantly 
before and after the merger. Thus the same values are used in both siutations. 
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Having investigated the pre-merger situation, the next subsection describes the post-
merger scenario followed by a comparison of these two situations.  
 
6.1.2 The Post-Merger Situation 
Suppose a merger between hospital units 2 and 3 occurs and no capacity constraints 
exist. Since all hospital wards produce exactly the same outputs, only hospital units 1 
and 2 persist in the market, whereas hospital unit 3  does not exist any more. 
 
 
The output matrix of the hospital market is then given by: 
 
    !! !KK! KK  6.29 
 
In the further analysis    1, 2, denotes the number of hospital wards, and >   1, 2, 
represents the two different outputs.  
 
 
As in the pre-merger situation, each hospital unit is trying to maximize its profits by 
choosing the optimal quantities. Therefore, the following profit function has to be 
maximized: 
 
 .       ∑ !K !  ! 4    ∑ KK !  K   ` 6.30 
 
 
To obtain the equilibrium values of the quantities that shall be produced, one again 
has to calculate the first order conditions for hospital units 1 and 2 (note that hospital 
unit 1 is a control ward, and hospital unit 2 is a merging ward): 
 
 
- Ward 1: 
 Ð !Ð !!    2!!   K!   0,1720  0,0132 !! 4  0,0069 !K 
  0,0039 _!! 4  0,0039 _!K  0 6.31 
 
 Ð !Ð !K    2!K   KK   0,1720  0,0013 !K 4  0,0069 !! 
  0,0039 _!! 4  0,0039 _!K  0 6.32 
 
 
 
- Ward 2: 
 Ð KÐ K!    2K!   !!   0,2777 4 0,1962 K!   0,0136 KK 
  0,0035 _K! 4  0,0035 _KK  0 6.33 
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Ð KÐ KK    2KK   !K   0,2777 4 0,1962 KK   0,0136 K! 
  0,0035 _K! 4  0,0035 _KK  0 6.34 
 
 
As in the pre-merger situation, it is assumed that each hospital unit produces the 
same amount of output 1 and 2, i.e.: 
 !   K 6.35 
 
 
Due to the symmetry condition under 6.35 the first order conditions can be solved, 
and the equilibrium quantities will be obtained: 
 
 11+   12+  0,3094  4 0,0013 _21   0,0013 _22 
  0,0027 _!! 4  0,0027 _!K   0,0133 6.36 
 
 21+   22+  0,380   0,0026 _21 4  0,0026 _22 
 4 0,0015 _!!   0,0015 _!K   0,1455 6.37 
 
 
 
The equilibrium price of output > in the post-merger situation is as follows: 
 
 +     ∑ +     !+   K+K !  6.38 
 >+  0,3106  4 0,0013 _21   0,0013 _22 
 4 0,0012 _!!   0,0012 _!K 4  0,1588 6.39 
 
 
 
The total industry output in the equilibrium is given by: 
 
 +  2 ·  1>+ 4  2 ·  2>+  6.40 
 +  1,3788    0,0026 _21 4  0,0026 _22 
  0,0024 _!! 4  0,0024 _!K   0,3176 6.41 
 
 
 
Inserting the values for the average salary and the average supply price given under 6.23 the equilibrium quantities and the optimal price of output > can be rewritten: 
 !!+   !K+  0,3094   0,1562 
 K!+   KK+  0,3800   0,2758 6.42 
 
 
 +  0,3106  4 0,4320 6.43 
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 +  1,3788   0,2391 6.44 
 
 
Also the cost and profit functions of hospital wards 1 and 2 can be calculated: 
 
!`+ 78  0,0006 K 4  0,3574  4 4.879,43 
 `K+ 79  0,0264 K 4  0,5368  4 4.675,01 6.45 
 
 !  0,1916 K   0,1871   4.879,43 
 K  0,2625 K   0,3798   4.675,01 6.46 
 
 
From the cost function of hospital unit 2 one can deduce that  N 431,10, since `K+  7 0 must apply.  
 
After carrying out the calculation of the equilibrium values for the pre- and post-
merger situation, a comparison between these two situations is given below. 
 
6.1.3 Comparison between these two Situations 
Having calculated the equilibrium values in both situations, a comparison between 
the outcomes can now be drawn. The investigation of the changes in costs and 
profits caused by a merger is of particular interest for this purpose. The following 
table summerizes the results obtained so far: 
 
 
 
Before the Merger 
 
 
After the Merger 
 
 !!+   !K+  0,2550   0,6220 
 
 !!+   !K+  0,3094   0,1562 
 
 K!+   KK+  0,2460  4 0,0363 
 
 K!+   KK+  0,3800   0,2758 
 C!+   CK+  0,2460  4 0,0363 
 
 
 +  1,4940   1,0981 
 
 +  1,3788   0,2391 
 
 +  0,2530  4 0,5490 
 
 +  0,3106  4 0,4320 
 
                                            
78
 It is assumed that the number of staffed beds is 30 as in the pre-merger situation. 
79
 It is supposed that for hospital unit 2 the number of staffed beds after the merger is two times larger 
than before the merger, i.e. 60. 
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Table 7 Comparison of the Equilibrium Values – Homogenous Outputs 
 
 
By comparing the output quantities it can be seen, that hospital unit 1 is producing 
more after the merger than before, whereas hospital ward 2 produces less after the 
merger than hospital wards 2 and 3 in the pre-merger situation. The table above also 
shows that the total output in the hospital market is lower in the post-merger situation 
if  7 7,46. Prices will be higher after the merger than before if  7 2,03. These 
results indicate that if   2,03; 7,46 the prices will be higher after the merger even 
if the total output is higher than before. That is a contradiction to the traditional 
horizontal merger analysis in chapter 2 where it is stated, that higher output 
quantities inevitably lead to lower prices.  
Moreover, these results indicate that if   0; 2,03 lower prices and higher total 
output after the merger occur. Nevertheless, it can reasonably be assumed that  is 
about 7,46 since the number of cases treated or the number of patient days will 
remain almost constant every year80. This means that the prices will definitely be 
higher after a merger than before. 
 
 
The costs of hospital unit 1 are higher after the merger if the following inequlity holds: 
 
                                            
80
 However it can be assumed that the total output will slightly decrease after a merger, since patients 
without health insurance (e.g. about 16% in the USA [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 
2004]) might hesitate to enlist medical assistance at higher prices. 
 
Before the Merger 
 
 
After the Merger 
!`+  0,0001 K 4  0,6033  4 3.898,04  
 
!`+  0,0006 K 4  0,3574  4 4.879,43  
 
`K+  0,0017 K 4  0,2540  4 5.655,13 
 
 
 
`K+  0,0264 K 4  0,5368  4 4.675,01 
 
 
`C+  0,0017 K 4  0,2540  4 5.655,13  
 
 
!  0,1291 K   0,6381   3.898,04  
 
!  0,1916 K   0,1871   4.879,43  
 
K  0,1228 K 4  0,0344   5.655,13  
 
K  0,2625 K   0,3798   4.675,01  
C  0,1228 K 4  0,0344   5.655,13  
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!`,À)-5J¹ÒJ¹+  7  !`,¹J-5J¹ÒJ¹+  
 0,0006 K 4  0,3574  4  4.879,43 7  0,0001 K 4  0,6033  4 3.898,04 
 
 0,0007   0,2459 4  OR!,CO,  7 0 6.47 
 
 
Due to the fact that    0;  431,10 this inequality is fulfilled, which means that the 
costs for hospital ward 1 are always higher after the merger. This is certainly not 
surprising since hospital unit 1 produces more in the post-merger situation. It is also 
not involved into a merger hence no efficiency gains can be obtained from that 
aspect.  
 
 
The situation differs for hospital ward 2, where efficiency gains can be achieved due 
to the merger. Comparing the costs of hospital unit 2 after the merger with the costs 
of hospital units 2 and 3 before the merger one obtains: 
 `K,À)-5J¹ÒJ¹+  7  `K,¹J-5J¹ÒJ¹+ 4  `C+  
 0,0264 K 4  0,5368  4  4.675,01 7 0,0017 K 4  0,2540  4 5.655,13 · 2  
 
  0,0298 K 4  0,0288   6.635,25 7 0 6.48 
 
Since this inequality is never fulfilled the costs after a merger are always lower for 
hospital unit 2 than the costs before the merger for hospital units 2 and 3. However, 
this is not surprising since hospital ward 2 produces less after the merger than 
hospital wards 2 and 3 before the merger. Nevertheless, the coefficients estimated 
by Sinay indicate efficiency gains81 being so high, that the costs of hospital unit 2 
after the merger are always lower than the costs of hospital unit 2 or 3 before the 
merger, even if hospital ward 2 after the merger produces more than hospital ward 2 
or 3 before the merger.  
 
 
By comparing the profits of hospital unit 1 it can be observed, that the profits after the 
merger are higher than before if  7 121,75, which is not expected to be the case.  
This situation is different for hospital unit 2, where the profits are always higher after 
the merger than the combined profits of hospital wards 2 and 3 before the merger. As 
mentioned above, this results from the high efficiency gains due to a merger as 
estimated by Sinay. It should be noted, that if  is about 7,46, the profits obtained by 
the hospital wards are negative. 
 
6.1.4 Conclusion 
The calculation results so far show that a merger between two hospital wards most 
likely leads to higher prices. It should also be noted that the profits of the merging 
                                            
81
 Before the merger the estimated coefficients for the output categories squared are positive, whereas 
after the merger the coefficients turned out to be negative for merging hospitals. These terms are the 
reason why the costs after the merger are that low.   
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hospital units are always higher after the merger since the costs are always lower. 
For the hospital unit which is not involved into a merger the situation is different. It 
bears higher costs as a result of higher production combined with profits, which only 
increase after a merger if  7 121,75. Since  is expected to be about 7,46 the 
profits of hospital ward 1 will be lower after a merger than before. 
 
 
However, a price increase due to a merger can only occur in the private hospital 
market or for people without a health insurance. This results from the fact that in the 
private hospital market every hospital negotiates its prices separately with each 
private insurer in regular intervals, for example once a year. A price increase is also 
possible for uninsured persons since they have to pay for every treatment at their 
own expense directly to the hospital.   
 
The situation for the public hospital market, where a public health insurance system 
is always involved, is fundamentaly different. There increasing prices due to a merger 
are not possible, because the public health insurers have set up their own rules to 
pay hospitals82.  
  
In this context it becomes a necessity to check if the profits of the remaining hospital 
wards are higher after a merger than before if the prices are not able to change (i.e. 
the pre-merger prices also occur in the post-merger situation). 
 
For hospital unit 1 this is the case if the following condition is fulfilled: 
 
 0,0273 K 4  0,5413   981,39 7 0 6.49 
 
This inequality is only valid if  7 179,95. Since it is assumed that  is about 7,46 this 
inequality can not apply. This means that if the prices after the merger are not 
allowed to change, then the profits of hospital ward 1 are always lower after the 
merger than before. 
 
In addition, one has to check if the profits of hospital ward 2 are higher after the 
merger –at pre-merger prices – than the profits of hospital wards 2 and 3 before the 
merger. The calculation shows that, because of the high cost savings due to the 
merger, this is the case.  
 
 
 
Thus, one can conclude that mergers in the public hospital sector are beneficial to 
the government if the joint industry profits after a merger are higher than the joint 
profits before the merger. As stated above, in both cases only the prices of the pre-
merger situation can be obtained. This is the case if the following inequality applies: 
 
 0,0004 K 4  0,2134  4 5.653,86 7 0 6.50 
 
Since this condition is always fulfilled, it can be noted that even if the profits of 
hospital unit 1 are lower after the merger, the joint industry profits are higher. This 
means that, from a financial point of view, mergers between hospital wards are 
                                            
82
 See Reinhardt U.E.: The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy (2006) 
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always beneficial in the public hospital market because even if the profits of hospital 
unit 1 are lower after a merger, the total industry profits will rise. Thus, one can 
conclude that in a public hospital market, where all hospital wards belong to the 
same owner, a merger is desirable. 
 
In a private hospital market mergers are only beneficial for merging hospital units but 
not for control hospital units because  7 121,75 will not apply. The fact that the 
industry profits are higher after a merger than before is not relevant for a private 
hospital market, since both hospital types do not belong to the same owner. A price 
increase is also not beneficial for uninsured patients, who have to pay medical 
treatment directly to the hospital. 
 
The results obtained so far depend of course on the shape of the hospital cost 
functions used, i.e. on the coefficients estimated by Sinay. 
 
After having investigated the consequences of a merger between two hospital wards, 
the next section will deal with a merger between two hospitals.  
 
6.2 Merger between Hospitals 
In the last section a merger between two hospital wards which produce 
homogeneous outputs was analyzed. In this section a merger between two hospitals 
with each hospital in the market producing differentiated outputs will be assumed. 
 
The inverse demand function is given by: 
 
       6.51 
 
In contrast to the linear inverse demand function under 6.3, the price of output > 
now depends on the quantities of all other outputs and not only on the quantity of 
ouput > produced. This assumption is based on the fact that there are no hospitals in 
the market which produce exactly the same output >. Therefore, the price of output > 
depends not only on the quantity of output > but also on all other possibly similar 
outputs.  7 0 is again a constant which reflects that the price of output > is positive 
even if no treatment in this output category occurs.  
 
6.2.1 The Pre-Merger Situation 
As in the analysis given in section 6.1 different hospital cost functions for the pre- and 
post-merger situation have to be assumed. The only difference to the cost function 
given under 6.5 is that now a merger between two hospitals will result in one new 
hospital x which produces 4 different output categories.  
 
 
The hospital cost functions for the pre-merger situation are given below: 
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• Cost Function for Merging Hospitals 
 
- Before the Merger: 
 `>  0,1637 1 4  0,1637 2 4  0,0178 12 4  0,0178 22   0,0079 1 2 
 4 0,6438 _! 4  0,3562 _K 4  0,1762 _!K   0,0500 _KK   0,1262 _! _K 
 4 0,0032 ! _! 4  0,0032 K _!   0,0032 ! _K   0,0032 K _K 
 4 0,3974 ZE@ 6.52 
 
 
• Cost Function for Control Hospitals 
 
- Before the Merger: 
 
`  0,1806 ! 4  0,1806 K 4  0,0065 !K 4  0,0065 KK   0,0142 ! K 
 4 0,6441_! 4  0,3559 _K 4  0,1327 _!K   0,0326 _KK   0,1001 _! _K 
 4 0,0096 ! _! 4  0,0096 K _!   0,0096 ! _K   0,0096 K _K 
 4 0,1954 ZE@ 6.53 
 
 
 
The meaning of the different explanatory variables is the same as in section 6.1, i.e.: 
The variable ZE@ represents the number of staffed beds in the hospital and shall 
reflect the fixed capital. The variable _! describes the average salary. _K denotes 
the average price of supplies for hospital . ! and K are the two possible outputs 
every hospital produces.  
 
It is assumed that a merger between hospitals 2 and 3 takes place, with hospital 1 as 
a control hospital, and hospitals 2 and 3 being the merging hospitals. 
 
 
 
Due to the fact that Cournot competition is assumed in the hospital market, each 
hospital has to maximize its profit function with respect to the quantities it is going to 
produce. Therefore, every hospital has to maximize : 
 
 .    ;   ∑ ∑ K !C ! = ! 4  ;   ∑ ∑ K !C ! = K  ` 6.54 
 
 
The first order conditions are as follows (note that hospital 1 is a control hospital, and 
hospitals 2 and 3 are merging hospials): 
 
 
- Hospital 1: 
 Ð !Ð !!    2!!   2!K   K!  KK   C!   CK   0,1806  0,0013 !! 
 4 0,0142 !K   0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.55 
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Ð !Ð !K    2!!   2!K   K!   KK   C!   CK   0,1806  0,0013 !K 
 4 0,0142 !!   0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.56 
 
 
 
- Hospital 2: 
 Ð KÐ K!    2K!   2KK   !!   !K   C!   CK   0,1637  0,0036 K! 
 4 0,0079 KK   0,0032 _K! 4  0,0032 _KK  0 6.57 
 
 Ð KÐ KK    2KK   2K!   !K   KK   C!   CK   0,1637  0,0036 KK 
 4 0,0079 K!   0,0032 _K! 4  0,0032 _KK  0 6.58 
 
 
 
- Hospital 3: 
 Ð CÐ C!    2C!  2CK    !!   !K   K!   KK   0,1637  0,0036 C! 
 4 0,0079 CK   0,0032 _C! 4  0,0032 _CK  0 6.59 
 
 Ð CÐ CK    2CK   2C!   !!   !K   K!   KK   0,1637  0,0036 CK 
 4 0,0079 C!   0,0032 _C! 4  0,0032 _CK  0 6.60 
 
 
 
To solve these first order conditions, it is assumed that each hospital in the market 
produces the same amount of its two different outputs, i.e.: 
 
 !   K 6.61 
 
 
Therefore, after some calculations the equilibrium quantities can be obtained: 
 !!+  !K+  0,1254  –  0,0024 _!! 4  0,0024 _!K   0,0008 _K! 4  0,0008 _KK 
 4 0,0004 _C!   0,0004 _CK   0,0269 6.62 
 
 K!+  KK+  0,1249  4 0,0008 _!!   0,0008 _!K   0,0008 _K! 4  0,0008 _KK 
 4 0,0004 _C!   0,0004 _CK   0,0183 6.63 
 
 C!+  CK+  0,1249  4 0,0008 _!!   0,0008 _!K 4  0,0008 _K!   0,0008 _KK 
  0,0012 _C! 4  0,0012 _CK   0,0183 6.64 
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The total output in the hospital market is as follows: 
 
 +  2 ·  1>+ 4  2 ·  2>+ 4  2 ·  3>+  6.65 
 +  0,7504   0,0016 _!! 4  0,0016 _!K   0,0016 _K! 4  0,0016 _KK 
  0,0008 _C! 4  0,0008 _CK   0,1270 6.66 
 
 
 
The equilibrium price of output > is given by: 
 
 +     + 6.67 
 +  0,2496  4  0,0016 _!!   0,0016 _!K 4  0,0016 _K!   0,0016 _KK 
 4 0,0008 _C!   0,0008 _CK 4  0,1270  6.68 
 
 
 
For a better comparison between the pre- and post-merger situation and furthermore 
for an easier calculation of the cost and profit functions, concrete values for _!, _K 
and ZE@ will be used. Sinay83 states that the mean number of staffed beds is 211 for 
merging hospitals and 212 for control hospitals. The values for _! and _K are shown 
under 6.23.  
 
 
Therefore, all equilibrium values calculated so far can be written as follows: 
 !!+  !K+  0,1254   0,3225 K!+  KK+  0,1249  4 0,0218 
 C!+  CK+  0,1249  4 0,0218 6.69 
 
 
 +  0,7504   0,5579 6.70 
 
 
 +  0,2496  4 0,5579 6.71 
 
 
 
Using the values under 6.23 and the avarge number of staffed beds for merging 
and control hospitals, the cost and profit functions for the three hospitals in the 
market can easily be calculated: 
 
!`+  0,2979  4 3.934,31 `K+  0,0005 K 4  0,1287  4 5.727,04 
 `C+  0,0005 K 4  0,1287  4 5.727,04 6.72 
 
 
                                            
83
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
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!  0,0626 K   0,3190   3.933,95 K  0,0619 K  4 0,0215   5.727,02 
 C  0,0619 K  4 0,0215   5.727,02 6.73 
 
 
After the investigation of the pre-merger situation, a merger between hospitals 2 and 3 will be assumed. 
 
6.2.2 The Post-Merger Situation 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a merger between hospitals 2 and 3 
will lead to a formation of a new hospital x which produces 4 different outputs. This 
means that for the further analysis only hospital 1, which produces 2 different 
outputs, and hospital x, which produces 4 different outputs, operate in the market. 
 
Thus, the output matrix of the hospital market is given by: 
 
   Ó !! !K{! {K    0 0{C {BÔ 6.74 
 
 
In the further analysis   1, x denotes the two hospitals, and >  1, 2, 3, 4 the 
different outputs in the market. 
 
The cost functions for the post-merger situation are given below: 
 
 
• Cost Function for Control Hospitals (i.e. Hospital 1) 
 
- After the Merger: 
 
`  0,1720 ! 4  0,1720 K 4  0,0066 !K 4  0,0066 KK   0,0069 ! K 
 4 0,6382_! 4  0,3618 _K 4  0,1541 _!K   0,0662 _KK   0,0879 _! _K 
 4 0,0039 ! _! 4  0,0039 K _!   0,0039 ! _K   0,0039 K _K 
 4 0,2272 ZE@ 6.75 
 
 
 
• Cost Function for Merging Hospitals (i.e. Hospital M) 
 
- After the Merger: 
 `>  0,2777 1 4  0,2777 2  4  0,2777 3 4  0,2777 4   0,0981 12   
  0,0981 KK  0,0981 CK  0,0981 BK 4 0,0136 ! K  4 0,0136 ! C 
 4 0,0136 ! B 4  0,0136 K C 4  0,0136 K B 4  0,0136 C B 
 4 0,6381 _! 4  0,3619 _K 4  0,1762 _!K   0,0033 _KK   0,1796 _! _K 
 4 0,0035 ! _! 4  0,0035 K _! 4  0,0035 C _! 4  0,0035 B _!  
  0,0035 ! _K   0,0035 K _K   0,0035 C _K   0,0035 B _K 
  0,2529 ZE@ 6.76 
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It is assumed that the two hospitals in the market compete in quantities. For that 
reason they have to maximize their profit functions in order to find the optimal 
quantities of the different outputs. The profit functions for hospital 1 and hospital x 
are given as follows: 
 !       !! 4     !K  !` 
 {       {! 4      {K 4     {C 4      {B   `{ 
 6.77 
 
 
To obtain the equilibrium output levels, the first order conditions have to be 
calculated (note that hospital 1 is a control hospital, and hospital x is a merging 
hospital): 
 
 
- Hospital 1: 
 Ð !Ð !!    2!!   2!K   {!   {K   {C   {B   0,1806  0,0013 !! 
 4 0,0142 !K   0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.78 
 
 Ð !Ð !K    2!!   2!K   {!   {K   {C   {B   0,1806  0,0013 !K 
 4 0,0142 !!   0,0096 _!! 4  0,0096 _!K  0 6.79 
 
 
 
- Hospital M: 
 Ð KÐ {!    2{!   2{K   2{C   2{B   !!   !K   0,2777 4 0,1962 {! 
 0,0136 {K  0,0136 {C  0,0136 {B   0,0035 _{! 4 0,0035 _{K  0 
 6.80 
 
 Ð KÐ {K    2{!   2{K   2{C   2{B   !!   !K   0,2777 4 0,1962 {K 
 0,0136 {!  0,0136 {C  0,0136 {B   0,0035 _{! 4 0,0035 _{K  0 
 6.81 
 
 Ð KÐ {C    2{!   2{K   2{C   2{B   !!   !K   0,2777 4 0,1962 {C 
 0,0136 {!  0,0136 {K  0,0136 {B   0,0035 _{! 4 0,0035 _{K  0 
 6.82 
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Ð KÐ {B    2{!   2{K   2{C   2{B   !!   !K   0,2777 4 0,1962 {B 
 0,0136 {!  0,0136 {K  0,0136 {C   0,0035 _{! 4 0,0035 _{K  0 
 6.83 
 
 
Again, it is assumed that every hospital produces the same amount of their different 
outputs, i.e.: !!   !K 
 {!   {K   {C   {B 6.84 
 
 
 
After solving the first order conditions, the equilibrium output levels can be obtained: 
 !!+  !K+  0,1650   0,0031 _!! 4  0,0031 _!K 
 4 0,0006 _{!   0,0006 _{K   0,0133 6.85 
 {!+   {K+  {C+  {B+  0,0854  4 0,0008 _!!   0,0008 _!K 
  0,0006 _{! 4  0,0006 _{K   0,0320 6.86 
 
 
 
The total output in the hospital market is given by: 
 
 +  2 ·  !+ 4  4 ·  {+  6.87 
 +  0,6716   0,0030 _!! 4  0,0030 _!K 
  0,0012 _{! 4  0,0012 _{K   0,1546 6.88 
 
 
 
The equilibrium price of output > in the post-merger situation is as follows: 
 
 +     + 6.89 
 +  0,3284  4 0,0030 _!!   0,0030 _!K 
 4 0,0012 _{!   0,0012 _{K 4  0,1546 6.90 
 
 
 
Again, using the concrete values for the average salary and the average supply price 
under 6.2384, the equilibrium values calculated above can be rewritten: 
 !!+  !K+  0,1650   0,2727 
 {!+   {K+  {C+  {B+  0,0854   0,0138 6.91 
 
 
                                            
84
 _!!  $ 233,9; _!K  $ 129 and _{!  $ 243,6; _{K  $ 134 
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 +  0,6716   0,6008 6.92 
 
 
 +  0,3284  4 0,6008 6.93 
 
 
 
Finally, the cost and profit functions from the two hospitals in the market have to be 
calculated. Therefore, it is assumed that the number of staffed beds is 212 for 
hospital 1 and 422 for hospital x85. 
 
!`+  0,0002 K 4  0,1912  4 4.920,64 
 `{+  0,0023 K 4  0,2266  4 4.631,22 6.94 
 
 !  0,1082 K   0,1720   4.920,97 
 {  0,1145 K   0,0395   4.631,25 6.95 
 
 
The cost function from hospital x has to be positive, which means that  N 1.469,12 
must apply.  
 
After calculating various equilibrium values for the pre- and post-merger situation, a 
comparison between these results can be given below. 
 
6.2.3 Comparison between these two Situations 
Due to a better comparison of the numerous equilibrium values calculated, the 
following table shall summerize the obtained results: 
 
 
 
Before the Merger 
 
 
After the Merger 
 
 !!+  !K+  0,1254   0,3225 
 
 !!+  !K+  0,1650   0,2727 
 
 K!+  KK+  0,1249  4 0,0218 
 
 
 {!+   {K+  {C+  {B+ 0,0854   0,0138 
 C!+  CK+  0,1249  4 0,0218 
 
 +  0,7504   0,5579 
 
 +  0,6716   0,6008 
 
                                            
85
 As noted in the pre-merger situation Sinay states that the average number of staffed beds is 211 for 
merging hospitals and 212 for control hospitals. Therefore, it is assumed that hospital 1 has 212 
staffed beds and hospital x has 2 ·  211   422 staffed beds.  
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Before the Merger 
 
 
After the Merger 
 
 +  0,2496  4 0,5579 
 
 +  0,3284  4 0,6008 
 
!`+  0,2979  4 3.934,31 
 
 
!`+  0,0002 K 4  0,1912  4 4.920,64 
 
 `K+  0,0005 K 4  0,1287  4 5.727,04 
 
 
 `{+  0,0023 K 4  0,2266  4 4.631,22 
 
 
 `C+  0,0005 K 4  0,1287  4 5.727,04 
 
 !  0,0626 K   0,3190   3.933,95 
 
 !  0,1082 K   0,1720   4.920,97 
 
 K  0,0619 K  4 0,0215   5.727,02 
 
 
 {  0,1145 K   0,0395   4.631,25 
 C  0,0619 K  4 0,0215   5.727,02 
 
 
Table 8 Comparison of the Equilibrium Values – Differentiated Outputs 
 
 
By comparing the output quantities it can be seen that hospital 1 treats more cases 
or rather patient days after the merger than before, whereas hospital x produces 
less than hospitals 2 and 3 combined before the merger. The total output in the 
hospital market is lower after the merger than before if  7 0,54. This means that 
the total output in the hospital market is always lower after a merger since it is 
assumed that  is always positive. The price of output > after the merger will rise if  7  0,54, which practically always applies. Furthermore, all output quantities in the 
pre- and post-merger situation are only positive if  7 2,57. As mentioned in the 
analysis of hospital ward mergers given above, it can be expected that the total 
output in the hospital market will not change significantly due to a merger since the 
number of cases treated or the number of patient days will remain almost constant 
every year. Thus, it is assumed that  equals approximately 2,6 because then the 
total output before and after a merger will be roughly the same (1,39 units of output 
before the merger and 1,15 units of output after the merger). Moreover, this value for  results in higher post-merger prices ($ 1,21 before the merger and $ 1,45 after the 
merger). 
 
 
Comparing the costs of hospital 1 for the pre- and post-merger situation, 
!`,À)-5J¹ÒJ¹+  7  !`,¹J-5J¹ÒJ¹+  applies if: 
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0,0002 K 4  0,1912  4 4.920,64 7  0,2979  4 3.934,31 
 
 0,0002   0,1067 4  ORD,CC,  7 0 6.96 
 
 
Since   2,57; 1.496,12 this inequality is always fulfilled. This means that the costs 
of hospital 1 are higher after the merger since the hospital is producing more but 
cannot obtain any further efficiency gains from joint production. In contrast, the 
efficiency gains in the pre-merger situation are higher as a result of the joint 
production, than they are in the post-merger situation86.  
 
 
The cost situation is different for hospital M because high efficiency gains owing to 
the merger can be obtained. By comparing the cost functions of the pre-merger and 
the post-merger situation it can be seen, that the coefficient from the variable {K  
changed significantly: From 40,0178 before the merger to 0,0981 after the merger. 
However, it should be testet whether the costs of hospital x are higher for some 
values of  than the costs for hospitals 2 and 3: 
 `{+  7  `K+ 4  `C+  
 0,0023 K 4  0,2266  4 4.631,22 7 0,0005 K 4  0,1287  4 5.727,04 · 2 
 
 0,0033 K   0,0308   6.822,86 7 0 6.97 
 
 
Since hospital x produces less than hospitals 2 and 3 and moreover high efficiency 
gains due to the merger can be obtained the inequality under 6.97 is never fulfilled. 
Hence the costs for hospital M are always lower than for hospitals 2 and 3 combined. 
Furthermore, the efficiency gains estimated by Sinay are so high, that the costs of 
hospital x are lower than the sole costs of each individual hospital 2 or 3 
respectively.  
 
 
 
With regards to the profit functions in the equilibrium it can be said, that if  7 145,52 
the profits of hospital 1 are higher after the merger than before. Since it can be 
expected that the total output in the hospital market will not change significantly (i.e.  is about 2,6), the profits of hospital 1 will decrease due to the merger.  
By comparing the profits of hospital x with those of hospitals 2 and 3 it can be seen 
that the profits of hospital x are higher if  N 852,09. The application of the above 
explanation ( is about 2,6) indicates, that the profits of hospital x are higher than 
those of hospitals 2 and 3.  
Moreover, if  is about 2,6, the profits realized by the hospitals are negative in both 
situations.  
 
                                            
86
 The coefficient from the interaction term ! K is 0,0142 in the pre-merger situation, and 0,0069 
in the post-merger situation.  
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6.2.4 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this section a merger between two hospitals will always lead to 
higher prices and lower industry output. The calculation results also show that the 
profits of the merging hospital x are higher after the merger if  N 852,09. Since the 
total industry output before and after the merger remains approximately the same ( 
is about 2,6 this will always be the case. The higher profits are caused by the higher 
prices but also the high efficiency gains achievable if a merger takes place. The 
situation for hospital 1 is different. The profits are only higher in the post-merger 
situation if  7 145,52 which is presumably not the case. Furthermore, hospital 1’ 
costs will always be higher after hospitals 2 and 3 have merged. 
 
Nevertheless, higher prices are only possible in the private hospital market where 
each individual hospital negotiates its prices separately with the private health 
insurers in regular intervals. Price increases are also possible for uninsured persons 
who have to pay a direct bill from the hospital for every treatment at their own 
expense. In contrast, higher prices are not feasible in the public hospital market since 
there public health insurers, which have their own rules for paying the hospitals, are 
always involved87. 
 
 
Thus it has to be investigated whether the total profits in the public hospital market 
are higher after a merger if only the pre-merger prices can be obtained. It can be 
expected that the profits of hospital 1 are lower after a merger than before since  7 145,52 will not apply. Thus, it is obvious that the profits of hospital 1 are still 
lower after the merger if the lower price from the pre-merger situation will be included 
in the calculation.   
 
The question wheter or not the efficiency gains due to the merger are so high, that 
the profits of hospital x after the merger (based on pre-merger prices) are higher 
than the profits of hospitals 2 and 3 before the merger, is of particular interest. This 
applies if the following condition is fulfilled: 
 
 0,0368 K   0,0928  4 6.822,79 7 0 6.98 
 
The inequality under 6.98 is valid if  N 429,32. Since the total output in the 
hospital market is only similar before and after the merger if  is about 2,6, it can be 
concluded that this condition is fulfilled.  
 
 
The joint profits in the public hospital market are higher after the merger if the 
following inequality is correct: 
 
 0,0166 K 4  0,083  4 5.835,80 7 0 6.99 
 
Condition 6.99 applies if  N 595,43, which obviously is the case.  
 
 
The above results show that a merger between public hospitals is beneficial since the 
joint industry profits are higher after a merger than before and control and merging 
                                            
87
 See Reinhardt U.E.: The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil of Secrecy (2006) 
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hospitals are both owned by the government. A merger in the private hospital market 
is only beneficial for merging hospitals but not for control hospitals because  7145,52 will not apply. Furthermore, a merger is not desirable for persons without 
health insurance, who would have to pay higher prices as an effect of the merger. 
 
 
In summery it can be stated, that a merger will always be profitable for the merging 
parties. In contrast the profits of the control hospitals or hospital wards are 
presumably lower after a merger than before. However, if the control and merging 
hospitals/hospital wards are public ones, the higher profits of the merging hospitals 
will more than outweigh the lower profits of the control hospitals. This does not apply 
to the private hospital market, since the control and merging hospitals/hospital wards 
do not belong to the same owner. Therefore, it can be expected that in the private 
hospital market control hospitals will oppose a planned merger. 
 
Nevertheless, I would like to note that these results depend on the shape of the 
hospital cost functions used for the calculations. In this case the results depend on 
the coefficients estimated by Sinay88.  
However, as mentioned in chapter 5, the selection of a representative cost function is 
a delicate issue: While several authors have estimated hospital cost functions, almost 
none of them has estimated hospital cost functions before and after a merger. Thus, 
it has to be assumed that the coefficients obtained by Sinay are characteristic, 
especially if looking at the high efficiency gains achieved by merging hospitals due to 
a merger. 
 
 
 
                                            
88
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of the Results 
The merger analysis of the hospital sector shows that the costs for control hospitals 
or hospital wards are higher after a merger than before89. However, this does not 
apply to merging hospitals or hospital wards, which will benefit from high efficiency 
gains due to the merger (as estimated by Sinay90). Furthermore, the profits of control 
hospitals or hospital wards will decrease as a result of a merger, whereas they will 
increase for merging hospitals or hospital wards.  
 
With regard to the prices it is assumed that these will not change as a consequence 
of a merger in the public hospital market, since both health insurers and hospitals are 
under public administration and the terms of payment are agreed directly between 
hospitals and public health insurers. In contrast, the analysis shows that for the 
private hospital market a price increase is most likely for a merger of two hospital 
wards whereas it will definitely result from a merger between two hospitals. 
 
Focusing on profits and costs only, the results of the merger analysis91 indicate that 
mergers between public hospital wards or public hospitals are always beneficial. This 
is supported by the fact that the joint profits of the total hospital market are higher 
after a merger than before, even if the prices remain the same. Thus mergers in a 
public hospital market can be regarded as an efficient tool for profit maximization and 
could consequently reduce the financial strain on the public healthcare system. 
 
Above clear statement cannot be given for a private hospital market. Although 
merging hospital wards or merging hospitals will benefit from a merger, all other 
market participants will suffer financial losses. This could lead to the closure of less 
profitable hospitals and thus cause a reduced density of supply with medical service 
for the public. Therefore, a recommendation of a planned merger will depend first 
and foremost on the division of the hospital market between private and public 
healthcare providers. 
 
7.2 Discussion 
The thesis shows that analyzing the hospital market several aspects, which play an 
essential role for the reliability and accuracy of the results, must be considered. With 
regard to the question how to measure hospital outputs it can be said, that the 
number of cases treated is the most defensible unit of output. This statement is 
supported by the fact, that modern terms of payment for hospitals are usually 
                                            
89
 This applies under the assumption that the total industry output does not differ significantly before 
and after a merger. This seems to be realistic since the number of cases treated or the number of 
patient days will remain nearly constant every year, regardless of whether a merger has taken place or 
not. 
90
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
91
 Generally, the results obtained depend on the shape of the hospital cost function used for 
calculation. Considering this it can be said, that all cost functions analyzed in the present paper show 
substantial similarity in shape. 
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performance-orientated92. Notwithstanding above said, none of the authors who have 
estimated hospital cost functions based on reliable empirical data has used the 
number of cases treated as the unit of output. Since these hospital data are not 
always easily available, the number of patient days is usually the only left output 
choice to estimate these functions. Thus significant output coefficients based on 
patient days had to be used for the horizontal merger analysis in the present work93. 
 
 
As a consequence of the lack of scientific literature on hospital cost functions in 
Europe, coefficients estimated by Sinay94 were used for the analysis. These 
estimations are based on data from hospitals in the United States for the time period 1987 –  1989. In order to determine whether the results obtained can also be applied 
to a typical hospital market in the European Union, a brief comparison between the 
hospital markets in the United States and for example Germany, having the largest 
population within the EU, is given below.  
 
With regard to the ownership type in the U.S. it can be said, that in the year 1999 24% of all hospitals were owned by the state/local government, whereas 61% were 
private non-profit hospitals. The remaining 15% of all hospitals in the U.S. were 
private for-profit ones95. 
On the other hand Wörz & Busse96 note that in the year 2001 53,6% of all German 
acute hospital beds were publicly owned, whereas 38,4% of all acute hospital beds 
belonged to private not-for-profit acute hospitals. Only 8% of all acute hospital beds 
in Germany were provided by private for-profit acute hospitals.  
While in the U.S. 1999 76% of all hospitals were privately owned, only 46,4% of all 
acute German hospitals 2001 belonged to the private hospital market. This 
indicates that a price increase due to a merger seems more likely in the U.S. 
compared to Germany, since in the public hospital market a public health insurance 
system, with fixed compensation arrangements for hospitals, is involved.  
 
With regard to the costs Anderson & Reinhardt & Hussey & Petrosyan97 note, that in 
the year 2000 only 3 acute care beds per 1.000 population in the U.S. were available, 
that 118 admissions per 1.000 population occurred, that the average length of stay 
was 5,9 days (for the year 1999), and 0,7 acute care hospital days per capita were 
present.  
In Germany on the other hand, 6,4 acute care beds per 1.000 population were 
available, 205 admissions per 1.000 population were present, the average length of 
stay was 9,6 days, and 1,9 acute care hospital days per capita occurred.  
 
                                            
92
 E.g.: Until 1997 the number of patient days has been the unit of measurement for the payment of 
hospitals in Austria. Since then a performance-orientated paying system based on admission and 
diagnosis is valid. – [Köck C.: Krankenhäuser können gefährlich sein (2009)] 
93
 For this calculation, mean values of the estimated coefficients based on empirical data from 202 
merging hospitals and from 202 control hospitals from the United States (nationwide sample) for the 
years 1987 – 1989, 1 year before and 2 years after a merger have been used. – [Sinay U.T.: Pre- and 
Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998)] 
94
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
95
 See Kaiser Family Foundation: www.statehealthfacts.org 
96
 Wörz M., Busse R.: Analysing the impact of health-care system change in the EU member states – 
Germany (2005) 
97
 Anderson G.F., Reinhardt U.E., Hussey P.S., Petrosyan V.: It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United 
States Is So Different From Other Countries (2003) 
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Moreover, the authors suggest that though Germany has both more acute care beds 
and admissions per capita and also a higher average length of stay than the U.S., the 
average costs per patient day or per hospital admission are considerably lower than 
those of the U.S. Hence Germany spends less per capita and as a percentage of the  on hospital care than the U.S. does. Providing an explanation for these 
differences, Anderson & Reinhardt & Hussey & Petrosyan state that the divers inputs 
used for providing hospital care (e.g. salaries, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals) 
are more expensive in the U.S. than in other countries. Furthermore, they note that 
the U.S. hospital market could be less efficient compared to other countries because 
of the complex U.S. payment system, which could require more administrative 
personal in U.S. hospitals. In addition, the authors show that in the years 1999 and 2000 sophisticated medical technologies (e.g. magnetic resonance imaging, coronary 
angioplasties and patients undergoing dialysis) were used more frequently in the 
U.S. compared to Germany. 
 
In summary it can be stated that the general applicability of hospital cost functions 
estimated for the U.S. to the EU hospital market can not be confirmed, since the 
average costs per patient day are substantially higher in the U.S. than in other 
countries.  
Moreover, price increases as a result of a merger are more likely than in the EU 
since private hospitals hold the largest market share in the U.S. 
Since the estimated hospital cost functions for the U.S. form the basis of the present 
hospital merger analysis, the results obtained would have to be tested before their 
application to any other hospital market in Europe.  
 
 
One can conclude, that the lack of general applicability of hospital cost functions 
based on U.S. data and the use of patient days as unit of output represent the most 
problematic parts of the present analysis. In order to conduct a reliable and 
sophisticated merger analysis of the hospital sector in Europe, coefficients derived 
from empirical data from EU hospitals before and after a merger would be needed, 
which however were not publicly available for the preparation of the present thesis. 
Thus more empirical research on hospital mergers in Europe would be highly 
desirable. Moreover, hospital output data being collected in the future should only be 
based on the number of cases treated and not on the number of .patient days, which 
may differ enormously between hospitals and do not reflect performance-orientated 
paying rules. 
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Abstract 
The present master thesis deals with mergers in the hospital market and their 
consequences, particularly on costs and profits. In the process, mergers between 
hospital wards and mergers between hospitals are analyzed. Therefore, it is 
assumed that hospital wards produce homogenous outputs whereas hospitals 
produce differentiated outputs. Before carrying out the analysis I investigate the 
questions which outputs a hospital is going to produce and how to measure the units 
of those. Different hospital cost functions are discussed and the relevant factors to be 
included in the merger analysis are determined. Since hospitals are multiproduct 
firms, also a brief reminder about multiproduct cost functions is given. Traditional 
merger analysis outlines only the consequences of a merger between single product 
firms. Therefore, the basic conclusions in traditional merger analysis are quoted.  
 
 
Mean values of the statistically significant coefficients estimated by Sinay98 are used 
to define the hypothesized hospital cost functions required for the analysis. The 
results99 show, that under the assumption that the total industry output does not differ 
significantly before and after a merger100, the costs for control hospitals or hospital 
wards are higher after a merger than before. However, this does not apply to merging 
hospitals or hospital wards, which will benefit from high efficiency gains due to the 
merger (as estimated by Sinay). Furthermore, the merger analysis of the hospital 
sector shows that the profits of control hospitals or hospital wards will decrease as a 
result of a merger, whereas they will increase for merging hospitals or hospital wards. 
 
With regard to the prices it is assumed that these will not change as a consequence 
of a merger in the public hospital market, since both health insurers and hospitals are 
under public administration. Thus the terms of payment are agreed directly between 
hospitals and public health insurers. In contrast, the analysis shows that for the 
private hospital market a price increase is most likely for a merger of two hospital 
wards whereas it will definitely result from a merger between two hospitals. 
 
Moreover, the higher profits of the merging hospitals or hospital wards after a merger 
can easily balance the loss of profits of those not involved in a merger, even if the 
prices remain unchanged. This indicates that particularly in the public hospital market 
mergers are desirable, since all hospital units and hospitals belong to the same 
owner (i.e. the public authorities). 
 
 
                                            
98
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
99
 Generally, the results obtained depend on the shape of the hospital cost function used for 
calculation. Considering this it can be said that all cost functions analyzed in the present paper show 
substantial similarity in shape. 
100
 This assumption seems to be realistic, since the number of cases treated or the number of patient 
days will remain nearly constant every year, regardless of whether a merger has taken place or not. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit Fusionen im Krankenhausmarkt und 
deren Auswirkungen, speziell auf Kosten und Gewinne. Dabei werden Fusionen 
zwischen Krankenhausabteilungen und Fusionen zwischen Krankenhäusern 
analysiert. Es wird angenommen, dass Krankenhausabteilungen homogene Outputs 
und Krankenhäuser differenzierte Outputs produzieren. Vor Durchführung der 
Untersuchung muss jedoch die Frage beantwortet werden welche Outputs ein 
Krankenhaus überhaupt produziert, und in welchen Einheiten diese gemessen 
werden können. Verschiedene Kostenfunktionen von Krankenhäusern werden 
diskutiert und die relevanten Faktoren, welche in eine Kostenfunktion inkludiert 
werden sollten, bestimmt. Da Krankenhäuser Mehrproduktunternehmen darstellen, 
wird ein kurzer Überblick über Mehrprodukt-Kostenfunktionen gegeben. Traditionell 
beschäftigt sich die Fusionsanalyse mit den Konsequenzen von 
Zusammenschlüssen von Ein-Produktunternehmen, weshalb ebenfalls die 
grundsätzlichen Folgerungen der traditionellen Fusionsanalyse aufgeführt sind. 
 
Zur Festlegung der für die Analyse benötigten hypothetischen Kostenfunktionen 
werden Mittelwerte der statistisch signifikanten Koeffizienten nach der Abschätzung 
von Sinay101  herangezogen. Die Resultate102 zeigen, dass unter der Annahme eines 
gleichbleibenden Gesamt-Outputs im Krankenhausmarkt vor und nach einer 
Fusion103, die Kosten für die Kontroll-Krankenhäuser bzw. -Abteilungen nach einer 
Fusion höher sind als zuvor. Dies gilt jedoch nicht für fusionierende Krankenhäuser 
bzw. Abteilungen, welche von den hohen Effizienzgewinnen in Folge einer Fusion 
profitieren (wie von Sinay geschätzt). Darüber hinaus zeigt die Fusionsanalyse des 
Krankenhaussektors, dass die Gewinne der Kontroll-Krankenhäuser bzw.  
-Abteilungen durch eine Fusion abnehmen, wohingegen sie für die fusionierenden 
Krankenhäuser und Abteilungen zunehmen werden.  
 
Da im öffentlichen Krankenhausmarkt sowohl Gesundheitsversicherer als auch 
Spitäler unter öffentlicher Verwaltung stehen kann vorausgesetzt werden, dass sich 
die Preise aufgrund einer Fusion nicht ändern. Der Grund hierfür ist, dass die 
Zahlungsbedingungen direkt zwischen Spitälern und öffentlichen Gesund-
heitsversicherern festgelegt werden. Demgegenüber zeigt die Untersuchung, dass 
eine Preissteigerung im privaten Krankenhausmarkt als Folge der Fusion zweier 
Krankenhausabteilungen sehr wahrscheinlich, als Folge einer Fusion zwischen zwei 
Krankenhäusern jedoch unausweichlich ist.  
 
Darüber hinaus können die höheren Gewinne der fusionierenden Krankenhäuser 
bzw. Abteilungen die geringeren Profite derjenigen, welche nicht in eine Fusion 
involviert sind, mehr als aufwiegen. Da im öffentlichen Krankenhausmarkt alle 
Krankenhausabteilungen bzw. Krankenhäuser im Besitz ein und desselben 
Eigentümers stehen (d.h. der öffentlichen Hand) kann der Schluss gezogen werden, 
dass besonders dort Fusionen vorteilhaft sind. 
                                            
101
 Sinay U.T.: Pre- and Post-Merger Investigation of Hospital Mergers (1998) 
102
 Die erhaltenen Resultate hängen im Allgemeinen von der Form, der für die Berechnungen 
verwendeten Spitalskostenfunktionen ab. Dazu kann festgehalten werden, daß alle im Zuge dieser 
Arbeit untersuchten Kostenfunktionen substantielle Ähnlichkeit in Ihrer Form aufweisen.  
103
 Diese Annahme scheint realistisch zu sein, da die Anzahl der behandelten Fälle oder die Anzahl 
der Patiententage jedes Jahr ungefähr gleich sein wird, unabhängig davon ob eine Fusion 
stattgefunden hat oder nicht. 
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